Gerald Steinberg, director of the Program on Conflict Management at Bar Ilan University in Israel, director of the NGO Monitor has some reflections on the Gaza Disengagement that reinforce many of the points made in our “paradigms” discussion posted last summer. I remember speaking with a high-ranking Israeli officer in Dover Tzahal (IDF Spokesman’s Office) last summer about the looming disengagement.
“Do you think it will lead to more or less Palestinian violence?” I asked.
“More Palestinian violence against Palestinians, yes.”
“No, more Palestinian violence against Israel?”
“Well that’s the million dollar question isn’t it?” he responded, genuinely not sure which it would lead.
The Honor-Shame Jihad paradigm anticipated that the withdrawal would be seen as a victory for violence, a credit to Hamas, a sign of Israeli weakness, and an invitation to further aggression. All those wonderful efforts to keep the greenhouses going registered as the (admirable) fantasies of people incapable of stepping outside of liberal cognitive egocentrism. But apparently many, even in the Israeli army, felt that the Disengagement was worth the gamble.
GERALD STEINBERG- RETURN TO GAZA: DISENGAGEMENT HAS FAILED
By • Gerald M. Steinberg
Published in: National Post June 29, 2006
As an early Israeli supporter of unilateral disengagement, I admit that this plan, like the earlier Oslo “peace process,” has failed. Hopes that the unprecedented move, including the dismantling of all Israeli military bases, checkpoints and even civilian houses in Gaza would reduce the violence and promote mutual accommodation were naive. Almost a year after the exit, attacks against Israelis continue to escalate, Palestinian society is in a state of advanced anarchy and the security pledges from Egypt and Europe, brokered by the U.S., have proven worthless.
The murder and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Palestinian terrorists, who launched the attack from a tunnel dug from a house in Gaza under the border, was the last straw. Even before then, the dozens of rockets raining down on houses and schools every week, and numerous other terror efforts, had already signalled the approaching end of this unique experiment in conflict reduction. Instead of taking advantage of the opportunity for progress, Palestinians moved their rocket launching teams into the most densely populated neighbourhoods, goading Israel into responding. And whenever a Palestinian was killed, even when Israel was not involved, they could count on political groups such as Human Rights Watch to condemn the Israeli Defense Force, regardless of the evidence.
This was one of the things I had in mind when I set up the Second Draft. It is the foolishness of our media in echoing the Palestinian victim narrative that makes it profitable for the Palestinian leadership (Hamas or Fatah) to abuse their own people and then scream bloody murder. If they didn’t have the media in the West covering their back, but instead criticizing them harshly for their inhumane attitude towards not only the Israelis but their own people, they would not be so prone to these strategies. In the long run (even middle run) it would be a contribution to peace if the press played its proper role.
The role of the Palestinian population in supporting terror is central, but the international community also bears considerable responsibility for the latest disaster. For years, the Europeans, the UN and others had provided massive support — financial as well as political — to PLO leader Yasser Arafat in the hope that he would make peace. After that proved to be a mirage and Arafat died, the members of the Quartet (the European-inspired framework designed to push hopes for peace co-operatively) pressed numerous schemes to prop-up Arafat’s successors. These failed to achieve anything of significance.
That’s because, born of the Politically correct paradigm, it was either doomed to non-implementation or failure… basically a band-aid put over a suppurating wound to give those who felt responsible the vague impression they were doing something.
Without skipping a beat, as soon as the Israelis left, the Palestinians extended the terrorist infrastructure to encompass the resources they had gained. A few months later, the entry of Hamas officials, pledged to radical Islam and the eradication of Israel, sped up this process.
There is, of course, the good possibility that their political success was the result of their claiming to have driven the Israelis out (despite what the media told us about corrupt PA officials).
As the attacks accelerated, and no evidence for a change for the better was forthcoming, Israelis also rediscovered the mistake of giving responsibility for their survival to outsiders. The security arrangements negotiated with Egypt and Europe, which accompanied the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza in August 2005, have all collapsed.
The first agreement was signed with the Egyptians, after former prime minister Ariel Sharon overruled many advisors, and agreed to remove Israeli troops from the 13-kilometer border strip between Gaza and Egypt. The IDF had been very active in stopping Palestinians from smuggling explosives, terrorists and various anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles under the border. Although turning over this responsibility to Cairo was a calculated risk, the hope was by making this move, Israel would be seen to have ended the occupation of Gaza. And perhaps the Egyptian presence along the border and inside Gaza would encourage the Palestinians to turn their energies from war to peace.
The similarities here to the Oslo process, where those warning against such catastrophic errors were dismissed as right-wing war-mongers is significant. When does warning about the belligerent intentions of the Palestinians become “respectable”?
In parallel, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brokered a separate security arrangement covering the Rafiah crossing. On Nov. 15, 2005, Rice pressed then prime minister Sharon to agree to a joint Palestinian-European Union arrangement in this very sensitive area. The U.S. was responding to pressures from the Europeans, who desperately wanted a major role in what was seen as the latest “peace process.”
A short time after the agreement was signed, Palestinians bulldozed a breach in the barrier along the Philadelphia corridor and moved freely into and out of Egypt. The 70 European “observers” were shunted aside and chased away by various Palestinian gunmen. As a result, the smuggling of weapons and terrorists has grown into a torrent, and these agreements have joined many others in the dustbin of Middle East peace efforts.
Note that along with guns and other weapons, the Palestinians brought over drugs and wives(!), the latter a sign of how superior the economy of Gaza — despite the worst of the Israeli occupation — in comparison with the economy of Egyptian Sinai.
The combination of Rice’s notion of how to work the problems here, her concessions to Europeans who are — at best — feckless, at worst collaborators with the Palestinians, and the confidence of the Palestinian “gunmen” that they can get away with anything they want, all helped to contribute to this debacle… predictable, but not any less a debacle for that.
After paying a high price for these hopes, Israelis have rediscovered the fundamental need for direct control over their own security. This lesson has been learned on many occasions — in 1948, when no one protected them from a mass invasion that almost crushed the nascent country; in 1967, when the UN suddenly removed the peacekeepers stationed in the Sinai following the previous war; and in 1973, when Egyptian forces were able to use weapons that the American-brokered cease-fire was supposed to have kept far away from the front. But after a few years, the combination of international pressure on Israel and the hopes that perhaps there will be changes this time, have led to another round of Palestinian attacks and a reluctant Israeli return to responsibility for its own security.
“High price for hopes…” — the epitaph of the Olso “Peace” Process. Part of the price was paid in high hopes, part in a reluctance to get dismissed as a “groupuscule d’extrême droite” (Enderlin’s favorite phrase for anyone who questions his al Durah coverage). In order to be “respectable” in most circles, one had to support these hope-filled initiatives.
It is still far too early to know how the return to Gaza will end. But even if the kidnapped soldier is released, the Israeli forces cannot simply turn around and leave Gaza, waiting for the next attempt. Israel is unlikely to reoccupy the poor and hate-filled cities, but the days when Palestinian groups could simply drive from Egypt into Gaza with weapons and terrorists are over. Reliance on outsiders — particularly Egypt and the European Union — for security is over, and Israel has no choice but to resume control over Gaza’s borders.
More occasion for the moral left to scream about Israeli imperialism and occupation.
This will at least help to prevent more terror and kidnappings, and perhaps eventually convince some Palestinians that the only option they have is to take control over their own society, and finally make the compromises necessary for real peace.
This last observation is far more easily made than carried out. The Palestinian commitment to victimization and the European and left-wing enabling of that demeaning and self-destructive posture is too powerful to break easily. When you’re afraid of failure, and you know you can blame the failure on someone else, even hope to succeed through that blamed failure, what’s to get you to try hard to succeed? Why on earth engage in the necessary self-criticism and run the risk of having to take responsibility. It’s so much more easy to blame someone else. Especially when you’ve got so many people cheering you on in your suicidal ways.
The real question: Can the Europeans and the “Left” wake up to the ways they are a) encouraging the worst behavior from the Palestinian leadership; b) victimizing the Palestinian people; and c) endangering themselves?
I had a conversation with my daughter the other day, and we spoke about the twin necessities for getting on with our lives rather than caught in the spiral of retaliation that’s so tempting to pursue. “For that you need two things: 1) the ability to self-criticize, and 2) the ability to give up wanting to retaliate.”
“Which is harder?” she replied.
Indeed, which? Especially when your desire to retaliate is directly related to your inability to self-criticize. Only intervention can help here, and only the Europeans and the “Left” are capable of effective interventions with the Palestinians. Can they? Will they? Not likely.
My real question here is: why is the “Left” so much in need of “retaliating” against Israel?