Benny Morris has a new book out on 1948. In the course of researching it he discovered how intense the religious dimension of the conflict that year. Such an observation is on the one hand, quite ordinary and empirical, on the other, a violation of the principles of cognitive egocentrism whereby the Arab objection to Jewish independence must be formulated and presented to the public as a “rational” objection, as a “nationalist” argument. Negotitations according to the PC Paradigm will only work if the dispute is about territories and rational national narratives that can come to a mutual understanding (2-state solution). But if it is profoundly zero-sum and religious in nature, then all the pacific bromides about war not being the answer fall by the wayside.
Here Morris discusses the religious dimension of 1948 and chides the modern historian for not taking it seriously.
Historians Should Take the Jihadi Rhetoric of 1948 Seriously
By Benny Morris
Mr. Morris is a professor of history at Ben-Gurion University and the author of 1948 (Yale University Press), from which this article is excerpted.
Historians have tended to ignore or dismiss, as so much hot air, the jihadi rhetoric and flourishes that accompanied the two-stage assault on the Yishuv [the Jewish residents of Palestine before the founding of Israel] and the constant references in the prevailing Arab discourse to that earlier bout of Islamic battle for the Holy Land, against the Crusaders. This is a mistake. The 1948 War, from the Arabs’ perspective, was a war of religion as much as, if not more than, a nationalist war over territory. Put another way, the territory was sacred: its violation by infidels was sufficient grounds for launching a holy war and its conquest or reconquest, a divinely ordained necessity. In the months before the invasion of 15 May 1948, King Abdullah, the most moderate of the coalition leaders, repeatedly spoke of “saving” the holy places. As the day of invasion approached, his focus on Jerusalem, according to Alec Kirkbride, grew increasingly obsessive. “In our souls,” wrote the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, “Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract feelings. In it we have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples.”
The evidence is abundant and clear that many, if not most, in the Arab world viewed the war essentially as a holy war. To fight for Palestine was the “inescapable obligation on every Muslim,” declared the Muslim Brotherhood in 1938.
The Muslim Brotherhood gained great strength from their anti-Zionist activities particularly during this period of the “Arab Revolt” of 1936-39, launching, according to Matthias Küntzel, their first “fanatical solidarity campaign in which the idea of Jihad was linked to the policies in Palestine,” and going from 800 to 200,000 years from 1936-38 (p. 21).
Indeed, the battle was of such an order of holiness that in 1948 one Islamic jurist ruled that believers should forego the hajj and spend the money thus saved on the jihad in Palestine. In April 1948, the mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Muhammad Mahawif, issued a fatwa positing jihad in Palestine as the duty of all Muslims. The Jews, he said, intended “to take over … all the lands of Islam.” Martyrdom for Palestine conjured up, for Muslim Brothers, “the memories of the Battle of Badr … as well as the early Islamic jihad for spreading Islam and Salah al-Din’s [Saladin’s] liberation of Palestine” from the Crusaders. Jihad for Palestine was seen in prophetic-apocalyptic terms, as embodied in the following hadith periodically quoted at the time: “The day of resurrection does not come until Muslims fight against Jews, until the Jews hide behind trees and stones and until the trees and stones shout out: ‘O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.’ “
Of quote not only marks the Jihad as apocalyptic, but also, alas, genocidal.
The jihadi impulse underscored both popular and governmental responses in the Arab world to the UN partition resolution and was central to the mobilization of the “street” and the governments for the successive onslaughts of November-December 1947 and May-June 1948. The mosques, mullahs, and ulema all played a pivotal role in the process. Even Christian Arabs appear to have adopted the jihadi discourse. Matiel Mughannam, the Lebanese-born Christian who headed the AHC-affiliated Arab Women’s Organization in Palestine, told an interviewer early in the civil war: “The UN decision has united all Arabs, as they have never been united before, not even against the Crusaders …. [A Jewish state] has no chance to survive now that the ‘holy war’ has been declared. All the Jews will eventually be massacred.” The Islamic fervor stoked by the hostilities seems to have encompassed all or almost all Arabs: “No Moslem can contemplate the holy places falling into Jewish hands,” reported Kirkbride from Amman. “Even the Prime Minister [Tawfiq Abul Huda] … who is by far the steadiest and most sensible Arab here, gets excited on the subject. “
Note that even the Christian Arab is swept up in the mood of collective empowerment. One cannot understand either the decisions of the Arab leadership in 1947-49, or the catastrophic scale of the defeat, if one does not understand the omnipotent inebriation they felt about their cause.
Nor did this impulse evaporate with the Arab defeat. On the contrary. On 12 December 1948 the ulema of Al-Azhar reissued their call for jihad, specifically addressing “the Arab Kings, Presidents of Arab Republics, . . . and leaders of public opinion.” It was, ruled the council, “necessary to liberate Palestine from the Zionist bands … and to return the inhabitants driven from their homes.” The Arab armies had “fought victoriously” (sic) “in the conviction that they were fulfilling a sacred religious duty.” The ulema condemned King Abdullah for sowing discord in Arab ranks: “Damnation would be the lot of those who, after warning, did not follow the way of the believers,” concluded the ulema.
The Naqba was not the terrible tragedy that befell the Palestinian refugees. They were collateral damage, soon to be turned into sacrificial victims by imprisonment in the camps. The real Naqba was the catastrophe of Jewish sovereignty in Dar al Islam — a humiliation to the Arabs, a blasphemy to Muslims.
An experienced academic historian has ONLY DISCOVERED the religious dimension of the conflict? And he wants to be taken seriously in his profession? After it has been demonstrated empirically that he has falsified evidence?
oao
http://fallofknowledgeandreason.blogspot.com/
Comment by oao — May 5, 2008 @ 11:14 am
the “new historians” have already done and are still doing irrepairable damage; morris’ “realization” comes too late and has little value, even if not 0.
Comment by oao — May 5, 2008 @ 11:18 am
here’s another must read piece on the real naqba: the myth of a palestinian nation
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/1948–israel–and-the-palestinians-the-true-story-11355
Comment by oao — May 5, 2008 @ 11:24 am
Bat Ye’or has often pointed out how the Arabic-speaking Christians harmed their own status by joining in the Muslim Arab jihad against Israel. But it seems that Britain and some other Western states, ostensibly acting in the interests of/as the protectors of these Christians/ encouraged their participation in the jihad.
It’s too bad that Morris didn’t understand the Islamic religious aspect of the Arab wars against Israel earlier.
I would like to examine his book and see whether he points out the fact that the first refugees in the Israeli war of independence were Jews driven out of their homes by Arabs in south Tel Aviv, parts of Jerusalem, etc. Jews were driven out of the Shim`on haTsadiq quarter of Jerusalem towards the end of December 1947!!! That’s four months before the Deir Yassin incident, whatever exactly happened there. In the first few months of the war, the Arabs had the upper hand militarily. Does Morris point that out.
Comment by Eliyahu — May 5, 2008 @ 12:25 pm
Note that even the Christian Arab is swept up in the mood of collective empowerment.
We noted, even as Arafat and his thugs slaughtered Christians in Lebanon in the 70s their Clerics were running arms and explosives from Lebanon into Israel and the West bank for the PLO.
People should take note of how strained relations between the Vatican and Israel became with the gaoling of Hilarion Capucci who used his official Black church Mercedes for gun running.
We can see in Sabeel group and Desmond Tutu the scummiest of Anglican hypocrites who stood by as Arafat’s thugs again took up strong arm tactics, this time against West Bank Christians.
Benny Morris should note how what he wrote in the past has been used to good effect by British anti-semites, noticeably some commenting on Melanie Phillips blog in the Spectator.
Comment by Cynic — May 6, 2008 @ 2:46 pm
I believe Morris exaggerates the relgious dimension. Mufti Haj Amin embodied Moslem religious hatered of Zionism. Contrary to what Morris says, Haj Amin never received the full support of Palestinian Arabs. Many Pals actively opposed the Mufti, right through the 1948 war. See Hillel Cohen’s, Army of Shadows.
Comment by Joel — May 8, 2008 @ 5:42 am
“Many Pals actively opposed the Mufti, right through the 1948 war.”
If that is true Joel how come Haj Amin was able to mobilize the Arabs in Palestine and to mount attacks on the Jews there in 1947?
Did you, btw, read Benny Morris’ book?
He has also written an incisive review of Hillel Cohen’s, Army of Shadows.
Here:
http://www.tnr.com/booksarts/story.html?id=0e100478-298c-438c-a994-e1800474ad19&p=2
Comment by Shriber — May 8, 2008 @ 10:38 am
Joel, the mufti Husseini was in fact the chief leader of the Palestinian Arabs from 1920 to 1949, approx., albeit he was appointed mufti by the British and head of the Supreme Muslim Council by the British in the early 1920s, although they knew that he was an extremist. Indeed, British officials encouraged his anti-Zionism, Judeophobia. For him, Islam was very important, so much so that he praised German National Socialism as similar to Islam in a speech to Bosnian Muslim SS men during the war [see J Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer].
The mufti also set up and headed the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, recognized by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry [1946] as the spokesmen of the Pal Arabs.
I’m sure that the other, minority faction among the Palestinian Arabs in those years [around the Nashishibi family] also saw Islam as important, but maybe less so. Anyhow, if one wants to make an Islamic or Quranic case for Zionism, one can find “Zionist” verses there, such as Sura 5:12 & 5:20-22, etc.
Comment by Eliyahu — May 8, 2008 @ 10:55 am
There’s an old German saying, “too soon old, too late smart.” Too many Israeli intellectuals like Morris and Amos Oz assumed that land was the only issue, but as Prof Landes points out, it’s about the emotional make-up of the Arabs, with Islam’s and Christianity’s antipathy towards Jews being a prime motivator. The other night, I watched a documentary on the 1967 war. Aside from being surprised by the scenes of pro-Israel demonstrators all over Europe out in the streets, one of the interviewees, a Syrian, spoke with great indignation about Israel capitalizing on the PR because a number of Arab leaders spoke of driving Israel into the sea. Unfortunately, the gormless documentary maker failed to ask the Syrian what was actually meant by “driving Israel into the sea” given that the ‘67 war preceded the occupation of the West Bank, etc.
Comment by Lynne T — May 8, 2008 @ 11:22 am
RE: #7.
Thanks Shriber for the book review cite.
There was a lack on enthusiasim to fight on their part of native Pals and Zionist intelligence services were reporting as much. Most Pals had had it with the mufti and with the rest of the Pal notables.
If the Pals had put up any real stiff resistance, there would not have been any need for an Arab Liberation Army or the intervention of the Arab States.
Comment by Joel — May 8, 2008 @ 1:39 pm
Joel, the mufti of Jerusalem wasn’t just anybody. He was the British-appointed mufti of Jerusalem [1921?]. British officials also created for him the Supreme Muslim Council which was to control the waqfs [awqaf] for the newly created territorial entity of “palestine.” Husseini was made of this council which disposed of the sizable revenues of the awqaf.. Later, he was chief of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine [note that they called themselves Arabs, not “palestinians”]. He was the chief leader of the Arabs in the country, although a minority faction led by the Nashishibi family, rivals of the Husseinis, were relatively moderate. The British of course favored the Husseini faction, although they were not at all moderate.
Islam was very prominent in the rhetoric of this Muslim leader. He addressed Bosnian Muslim SS troops during the war, saying that German National Socialism had much in common with Islam [see J Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer].
I have no doubt that the Nashishibis too saw themselves as loyal Muslims. By the way, there are a number of Quranic verses that could be considered Zionist or pro-Zionist [such as Sura 5:12 & 5:20-22]. However, these verses are usually considered abrogated by later verses.
Comment by Eliyahu — May 8, 2008 @ 4:55 pm
Eli. At heart, the Mufti was a Nazi. No doubt about it. Nor was he a nobody. But the fact remains that, in 1947, when he called for jihad against the Zionists, most Pals stayed home, whatever the reason, and in spite of the Husseinis religious rhetoric. Haj Amin Husseini faced Pal opposition from before he was appointed Mufti. Endless Pal land sales to the Zionists is proof positive that Pal society had been fragmented and that the Mufti was the Supreme Leader of Pal nationalism in name only. He was a thug who inspired fear, but could not lead a fragmented society.
Comment by Joel — May 9, 2008 @ 6:34 am
here’s morris’ current take:
http://www.newsweek.com/id/136085/page/1
Comment by oao — May 11, 2008 @ 3:02 pm