Chapter 8 from Stuart Green’s thesis. Previous postings available here.
He prefaces it with the following remarks:
Richard, this is chapter eight. I hope it’s not too long, but I sense there are some conceptual problems with it that I can’t quite put my finger on. I’d love to get feedback from your readers and pick their brains. Also, some of your readers were asking about the difference between cognitive warfare and, say political warfare as waged by the Soviets and Chinese. As I continue to read more about political warfare, I do see a great deal of overlap. There are still differences, however. My theory is quite broad, perhaps too broad, as it stretches down to the basic building blocks of the idea, up through culture, ideology, and the pointy parts of PSYOP. I also need to note the importance of psychology itself.
THE MODERATE MEME OFFENSIVE, COGNITIVE PARALYSIS, AND DHIMMITUDE
The last chapter focused a great deal on deception in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but with particular emphasis on its operational applications. Delving a little more into deception, the first half of this chapter moves away from the blunt operational manifestations and toward some of the slight-of-hand, soft rhetoric used by related jihadist groups in other parts of the West, namely the U.S. and Europe. It seeks to demonstrate that jihadists have successfully targeted American and European politicians, academics, and journalists with deceptively moderate memes designed to infiltrate and disarm the Western discourse. They have managed to hide agendas that are not only pernicious to Israel, but to secular Western society as a whole. The second half of this chapter addresses the Western intelligentsia’s reaction to evidence of the uncomfortable truth: cognitive dissonance and paralysis. In the end, it argues that the failure to confront these realities as they become progressively clearer constitutes a form of modern dhimmitude. That is, the failure to confront violence, violent rhetoric, and violent ideology represents unwitting submission to an Arab-Muslim agenda.
USE OF MODERATE MEMES
In times of particularly intense conflict the accepted discourses have naturally shifted toward the extreme. During the World Wars entire enemy populations became associated with rapacious destruction and evil, as were “the Hun” during WWI and the Japanese during WWII for Americans. In the current context, however, only the Arab-Muslim society maintains that it is now (and always has been) at war with Western society. Western society, for its part, continues to think of war in confined, sporadic terms—certainly, war is not perceived as a millennial imperative. Today the accepted Western discourse, with some exceptions, does not allow for the suggestion that it is in a civilizational war—such talk is generally denounced as racist or Islamophobic. Thenceforth, “extreme” rhetoric is permitted within the mainstream, Arab-Muslim discourse, while the Western discourse remains relatively unradicalized.
Professor Anna Geifman of Boston University observes the frequent appearance of a particular question after terrorist attacks: “What did we do to make them hate us?” The emergence of this question demonstrates not only that the Western discourse remains comparatively unmoved by even the violent manifestation of the war—there is little “mobilization” in the Western discourse when compared to WWI, WWII, or the current Arab-Muslim discourse—but also that it is decidedly vulnerable to hostile ideologists and their “moderate” supporters who indulge in answering the question.
Few ask the more relevant question Landes suggests, which holds particular value for our own cognitive warriors: “What are they telling themselves that makes them hate us?” The accepted pattern is to point out a variety of Western policies as the genesis of Arab-Muslim anger and conflict. This kind of thinking—not completely without value—stems from guilt-culture and maintains that we can find out “why they hate us” by opening a “dialogue,” and possibly even improve relations by admitting culpability. For this to be theoretically possible, the Western elite must find a moderate Arab-Muslim cadre to sit across the table, and because universalist memeplexes insist that there is such a cadre, cognitive warriors happily provide them.
Stephen Coughlin suggests that the moderates of respective societies interact with each other to feed temperate, sometimes “soft,” impressions of the other culture back into their own society’s discourse (see chapter 2). There are also influential individuals and groups wholly aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas who use taqiyya to make themselves appear moderate by Western standards, that is, they pass themselves off as the best chance for “mutual understanding” and inter-societal progress. By appropriately aligning their memes for infiltration and infection, these groups and individuals soften Western policy-makers, academics, and journalists, most of whom are neither familiar with taqiyya nor the depth and extremity of the opposing ideology. These deceptively moderate elements are on the front lines of the cognitive war and arguably present the most dangerous, most capable threat to the West.
Schleifer demonstrates that their activities represent one of the more “mastered” elements of cognitive warfare. During the first intifada, Palestinian leaders broke down their PSYOP target audiences into several subcategories. Western democratic audiences, for instance, were divided between Arab-American/Europeans, opinion makers, Muslim groups, Jewish liberals, and the general public. Walid Shoebat’s anecdote above gives some clue as to the extent of Fatah’s message tailoring in the U.S., but Schleifer notes that Palestinians also study in Israeli universities. “One notable example is Ibrahim Karaeen, a leading Fatah member who in 1978 opened the Palestinian Press Service in East Jerusalem,” to translate publications and give foreign correspondents a new, Palestinian perspective. 
Steven Emerson highlights some of the activities of the more infamous jihadists in the U.S., including Sami al Arian, a University of South Florida professor with strong ties to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and who has been taped shouting “death to Israel” in Arabic. Arian established two organizations dedicated “exclusively for educational and academic research and analysis, and promotion of international peace and understanding,” which could easily have attracted the interest of unsuspecting students and academics.
There is a multitude of organizations on Western campuses dedicated to boycotting Israeli products and Israeli academics. Their prevalence and several recent events have demonstrated the extent to which the Palestinian narrative has penetrated some campuses. Palestinian “trade unionists,” representing a wide variety of professional, often leftist, associations in the territories, agitate internationally for Palestinian causes (they may do so on behalf of the PA, although this requires additional investigation), most commonly calling for intellectual and commercial boycotts of Israel on humanitarian civil rights grounds.
Recently, they received a significant moral boost when at least two British unions—the British University and College Union (UCU), claiming to speak for 120,000 British educators, and “UNISON,” a union claiming to represent 1.3 million public sector workers—passed similar resolutions calling for anti-Israel intellectual and military boycotts. They pledged support for the Palestinian “people’s right to self-determination and to establish a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with its capital in Jerusalem.” Unions and activists such as these do not generally intend to support the violent activities of Palestinian ideologists, but from the ideologist’s perspective, that type of support is a tertiary concern. By way of international pressure, cognitive warriors seek only to trigger Israel’s self-imposed military restraint, which subsequently allows jihadists more freedom for their own military operations.
Lest the substantive connection between militants and apparently moderate organs like the trade unions mentioned above be doubted, it is important to remember the previous sections of this thesis which established the level of militant control over the Palestinian discourse. Even for genuinely independent groups with specialized causes, only memes that are in line with or beneficial to “radical” ideology may be permitted. Moreover, many jihadist groups have used deception to establish new groups that appear independent and moderate, but remain connected to and work for the benefit of their parent organization.
The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood?
The Muslim American Society (MAS) is one such example. Formed in 1993, its “leadership was instructed to deny their affiliation with the [Muslim] Brotherhood, their strategy was to operate under a different name but promote the same ideological goals: the reformation of society through the spread of Islam, with the ultimate goal of establishing Islamic rule in America.” Like several other organizations claiming to serve as conduits for dialogue with American Muslims, the MAS was in fact established by the global Muslim Brotherhood movement, which, according to an internal memorandum made public at the Holy Land Foundation trial in Texas, wages
a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.”
Perhaps the best known Brotherhood scion and arguably the most influential American Muslim organization is the Council for American Islamic Relations (CAIR). Established in 1994, this organization descended from yet another influential offshoot, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP). According to another internal memorandum, the IAP “absorbed most of the [Muslim Brotherhood’s] Palestinian energy at the leadership and grassroots levels in addition to some of the brothers from other countries,” and it developed the Palestine Committee and Hamas, often described as a sister organization by the IAP’s leaders.
Given CAIR’s family history, it comes as no surprise that the Council is also active in Palestinian causes in its mission as interlocutor, but unlike other jihadist groups based in the U.S., its influence dramatically expanded after 9/11. A quick perusal of CAIR Pennsylvania’s website indicates that the organization has successfully bent the ear of over 50 senators, representatives, state governors, and city council members, all of whom “applaud CAIR’s mission to enhance understanding and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.” Even President Bush stated that it was his “honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do… They love America just as much as I do.”
This kind of adulation is common and poignantly shows the group’s success in penetrating the American discourse. Even the Muslim Brotherhood itself, the progenitor of virtually every significant, modern, violent, Sunni jihadist group, is frequently portrayed as a moderate organization committed to democratic ideals and peaceful transformation of society. One Foreign Affairs article written in this vein presents it as a viable alternative in “the anxious and often fruitless search for Muslim moderates,” and suggests that “policymakers should recognize that the Muslim Brotherhood presents a notable opportunity.” This article, in fact, warrants a slightly closer look as it demonstrates that even those who have carefully studied a jihadist organization can fall prey to its claims of moderation.
An honest academic attempt to dissect the ideological war, Robert Leiken’s and Steven Brooke’s “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” is not a purely apologetic look at the group. The fourteen page article suggests some interesting divides that might be exploited under the massive umbrella organization, traces an interesting history that presumably led the Brotherhood to reject violent jihad and embrace democratic means for acquiring power, and points to some of its leaders who refrained from inciting their constituents and even (outwardly) worked to control them in times of heightened tension. The authors even acknowledge that “many analysts… sensibly question whether the Brotherhood’s adherence to democracy is merely tactical and transitory—an opportunistic commitment to, in the historian Bernard Lewis’ words, ‘one man, one vote, one time.’” Like so many others who make similar attempts, however, Leiken and Brooke’s work suffers from at least two key flaws.
First, they make only passing and indirect reference to the phenomenon described at length in this thesis, taqiyya. They write, “A recent article in the journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology found worrying discrepancies between the English and Arabic versions of certain articles on the official Muslim Brotherhood Web site,” making it apparent that they, like other Westerners, began their analysis with little suspicion of systematic deception and merely stumbled across some apparently minor problems. Although the authors at least acknowledge that “Islamists have been accused” of a double discourse, the manner in which they diminish the claim shows they do not understand that taqiyya necessarily brings into question all the Brotherhood’s externally targeted statements. Had Leiken and Brooke read the transcript for this meeting of the IAP’s senior leaders, they might have given more credence to the claim.
I swear by your God that war is deception. War is deception. We are fighting our enemy with a kind heart and we never thought of deceiving it. War is deception. Deceive, camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way…. Deceive your enemy. [Another states:] This is like one who plays basketball; he makes a player believe that he is doing this while he does something else…. I agree with you. Like they say; politics is a completion of war.
Second, they are either unaware of or conspicuously fail to address several key documents and key leader quotes which—despite their best and arguably successful efforts at deception—should destroy any semblance of the Brotherhood’s moderation. The finest example, mentioned above, describes the group’s pernicious effort to “destroy Western civilization,” a goal that remains in place despite the outward rejection of violence. But there are numerous quotes from the Brotherhood’s and CAIR’s key leaders which less-than-subtly suggest their underlying discourse is vitriolic and destructive. In a “Meeting Agenda for the Palestine Committee” in 1994, for instance, the Brotherhood flatly rejects the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, equates normalization of Arab-Israeli relations with “surrender,” ironically suggests that Jewish attempts to establish dialogue are meant to break the Muslim psychological barrier, and proposes a plan to obstruct the peace process.
The Islamic and Arabic World is being overrun by a vigorous campaign to normalize the relations between the Muslims and the Arabs from one side, and the Zionist entity from another side…. Dr. Edward Sa’id, one of the participants in these dialogues, says that the Zionist organizations were planning this type of dialogues in order to break the psychological barrier that the Arabs and Palestinians have so that they accept the Jews and their country…. [The counter-strategy is thus:] The activation of the role of (MAS) to educate the brothers in all work centers, mosques and organizations on the necessity of stopping any contacts with the Zionist organizations and the rejection of any future contacts…. An internal Brotherhood committee to fight the normalization of relations and monitor the brotherhood organizations and others, and giving advice to them in the best ways…. [The] attempt to stop the normalization that is happening under any umbrella. Activating the role of the Association [IAP] and its publications to take up its media role in this area.
In 2004 Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the international Brotherhood’s leader, made repeated statements calling for Israel’s destruction, lauded Iraqi and Palestinian suicide bombers, and claimed that there is no evidence pointing to al Qaida’s responsibility for 9/11.
Between statements assuring the American public of their peaceful intentions and desire for dialogue, CAIR’s own top leaders have betrayed an underlying perspective that defies moderation. According to a well-sourced article by Emerson, CAIR’s chairmen, directors, and other key leaders have:
· Supported Saudi financial assistance to families of “martyrs.”
· Used the term “zionazi” to describe Jews.
· Defended Holocaust denial and asserted that Jews control the media
· Invited neo-Nazis to speak at several conferences
· Repeatedly defended Yusuf al Qaradawi, who believes that “there should be no dialogue with [Israelis] except through swords,” and has said, “these are not suicide operations… these are heroic martyrdom operations.”
· Supports the concept of “blasphemy laws” which would “broaden the scope of anti-hate laws” to prohibit blasphemy directed at religious symbols, including cartoons depicting Mohammad.
· Claimed that violent resistance to Israel is necessary. In October 2000, Nihad Awad, a CAIR co-founder, attended a rally during which protesters shouted “Khaibar, Khaibar, Ya Yahud, Jaysh Muhammad Safayood” (Khaibar, Khaibar, O Jews, Muhammad’s Army is coming for you).
Leiken and Brooke are by no means the only authors to miss these statements or fail to dig into jihadist’s underlying motives, but I have used it as an example of jihadist success in penetrating, indeed, helping to form the Western discourse. One may conclude that these authors are victims of taqiyya and their willingness to unquestionably embrace the organization’s potential for engagement is the intended product of their deceptive practices. It essentially demonstrates that these individuals’ willingness, indeed their need to believe in the moderation of the Brotherhood for memetic salvation—dovetailed with the group’s efforts to appear moderate.
Dissection of a Hamas Editorial
A recent editorial in the Washington Post by Mahmoud al Zahar, one of Hamas’ co-founders, demonstrated the remarkable skill with which even genocidal Palestinians may frame their objectives in Western narratives. When Western icons like former President Carter subscribe wholeheartedly to the Palestinian narrative, and then pile on with words like “apartheid,” much of Hamas’ work is done, or at least done for it. As words like this become part of the Western narrative and are reinforced by unwitting agents like Carter, Hamas appears less extreme when its members use similar or even more extreme terminology. In short order, Hamas’ true objectives—none of which have softened—are quickly forgotten as al Zahar’s plea to sit at the “peace” table is contrasted with Israel’s seemingly unreasonable refusal to have them.
In the editorial al Zahar states negotiations cannot succeed if there are preconditions to sitting at the table—a reasonable statement on the face of it. But Hamas has its own preconditions that would effectively eliminate the Jewish state legally and demographically before negotiations begin in earnest.
A “peace process” with Palestinians cannot take even its first tiny step until Israel first withdraws to the borders of 1967; dismantles all settlements; removes all soldiers from Gaza and the West Bank; repudiates its illegal annexation of Jerusalem; releases all prisoners; and ends its blockade of our international borders, our coastline and our airspace permanently. This would provide the starting point for just negotiations and would lay the groundwork for the return of millions of refugees. [emphasis added]
These demands, lest they appear extreme to western eyes, are placed much deeper in the letter and sandwiched between two softer, more palatable statements. The opening bracket is designed to demonstrate that Hamas is not in fact an anti-Semitic organization: “Judaism—which gave so much to human culture in the contributions of its ancient lawgivers and modern proponents of tikkun olam…” while the closing bracket appeals to our humanity: “I am eternally proud of my sons and miss them every day. I think of them as fathers everywhere, even in Israel, think of their sons—as innocent boys, as curious students, as young men with limitless potential—not as “gunmen” or “militants.”
It is difficult to know how the editorial was received by Western eyes, but one may reasonably count this salvo as a well-aimed one. Al Zahar managed to couch extreme objectives in a memetic configuration that the West is predisposed to accept. An observant reader will notice that nowhere in the letter is there any suggestion of Palestinian responsibility for the Palestinian plight, nowhere in the letter is there any indication that Hamas intends to compromise on any issue. In fact, if one is familiar with the long term, uncompromising quality of Palestinian strategies, the last line waxes particularly ominous, “As for the Israeli state and its Spartan culture of permanent war, it is all too vulnerable to time, fatigue and demographics: In the end, it is always a question of our children and those who come after us.” To Westerners, this statement may seem innocuous. By design the inferred meaning is, “Israel cannot maintain its intransigence forever. We may fail, but our children will successfully reach a settlement.” For the Palestinian audience, the meaning is entirely different. It is that “Israel cannot hold out forever. We will outbreed them if we cannot first pick them apart with negotiation.”
COGNITIVE PARALYSIS: MEMETIC REACTION TO UNFORESEEN DHIMMITUDE
Litmus Tests for Western Minds
The surest sign of a cognitive campaign’s success is the enemy’s willing assistance. Geifman suggests the pliant behavior of Western journalists, among other members of the intelligentsia, constitutes a type of Stockholm Syndrome. She notes that questions such as the one noted above (“What did we do to make them hate us?”) bring home the responsibility for terrorism and avoid the uncomfortable exploration of the true underlying causes for jihadist ideologies. Her thinking parallels that of Bat Ye’or, who claims the political left, although meaning well, has essentially subjugated Western culture to the status of historical dhimmi by taking redress of Western colonial practices to an extreme. This is in excess of the tendency to assume that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR are moderate.
This is, in fact, a kind of suicidal, intellectual paralysis that occurs when incontrovertible evidence of pernicious motives surfaces. As an extreme form of cognitive dissonance, it is the stubborn tenacity of old, discredited memeplexes to charge on in a self-destructive direction. It is the hope that those using the West’s own “miserable hands” to destroy it will become enlightened before the destruction is completed. It is, in essence, a strange, semi-conscious submission to dicrocoelium dendriticum, the parasite that drives ants to suicidal behavior. In a critical time, the discourse has excused practices and behavior that would not be tolerated from non-Muslim American/European or Israeli quarters (Amnesty International has effectively acknowledged this). As in the historical context of dhimmitude, the “subjects” dare not speak ill of Islam lest there be violent consequences—or accusations of racism or Islamophobia—and they make political and economic concessions without reciprocation.
The row over publication of the Danish cartoons depicting Mohammad and the subsequent apologies is probably the best-known illustration of this. In another example, then French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy appeared reluctant to acknowledge the ethnic identity of many anti-Semitic attackers in 2003, stating, “Anyone who explains the resurgence of anti-Semitism by the Middle East conflict is saying something wrong. Anti-Semitism existed before the existence of Israel.” It is important to note that, at the time, the al Aqsa intifada raged and many of the anti-Semitic attacks in France were perpetrated with specific reference to it. Moreover, it was clear French Muslims constituted a disproportionate share of the attackers (see below). Sarkozy, known as a hard line conservative on immigration issues, shied away from acknowledging this and instead chose to refocus attention on Europe’s pre-Muslim tradition of anti-Semitism. Whether for fear of treading on Muslim sensitivities, fear of being labeled Islamophobic, or fear of sparking wider violence, Sarkozy’s comments can be construed as a form of dhimmitude.
Other examples of contemporary dhimmitude include: the France 2 evening news program’s failure to report the Muslim identity of most attackers in the 2005 riots, instead calling them “les jeunes” (the youths); the dietary provisions for Muslim students in a secular school system; non-Muslims fearfully moving out of neighborhoods due to intimidation; non-Muslims abstaining from wearing Christian or Jewish paraphernalia for fear of being attacked; Jews switching to friendlier schools with fewer radical students; and non-Muslims feeling compelled to use “non-Muslim bathrooms” to avoid retribution. Although it eventually happened, there was initially a lack of French institutional will to completely shut down al Manar, Lebanese Hezbollah’s television station dedicated to disseminating anti-Semitic vitriol, propaganda about the eventual destruction of Israel, and videos glorifying gore and martyrdom.
Some argue that the general coolness of the European discourse and policies toward Israel and US initiatives constitute a form of dhimmitude as well. The Madrid bombings of 2004 led to Prime Minister José María Aznar’s electoral defeat and the subsequent Spanish withdrawal from Iraq. Although it is popularly maintained that the election upset and withdrawal were indirect consequences of the Spaniards’ distrust for their government, jihadists quickly picked up on the violence=results equation, a lesson that falls squarely in the dhimmitude construct. French policies in the Middle East today trace their roots to decisions made by Charles de Gaulle after World War II, who desired that France remain an influential nation beholden to no superpower.
In Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis Bat Ye’or argues that Europe, led by France, willfully and deliberately conceded the political and academic discourse about Israel to Arabs. The concession was demanded as part of the price for increased economic and political ties that the French desired to counterweigh U.S. global influence and re-secure their prominence. The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), a concept floated by the French shortly before the 1973 war in Israel, gained true significance when Europe sought to escape—through dialogue and concession—the oil embargo resulting from that War. Arab partners in the EAD and other dialogue bodies made no secret of the fact that cooperation was contingent chiefly on European anti-Israel rhetoric and policies, but there were other important concessions as well.
European intellectuals, who may not have fully understood the hegemonic nature of jihad, supported not only the establishment of large Muslim-Arab communities on European soil, but the development of education centers espousing jihad. Ye’or writes:
The educational and cultural programs of the European Islamic Centers, which were introduced by the EAD into European schools, seem to reflect the concept of the Jihad (Holy War) Fund [envisioned by Mohammed Hasan Mohammed al Tohami, who sought to help Muslims resist “alien thought and foreign ideology”]. These programs were wholeheartedly embraced, applied and monitored by European leaders, intellectuals, and activists.
With the Arab-Muslim presence in Europe now firmly established and the accepted discourse arguably anti-Israel, at least half of the joint vision may have been achieved. Ye’or would probably argue that Europe failed to use the Arab world to counter U.S. influence, but the Arab world nonetheless achieved disproportionate influence in European circles. There often appears to be a level of respect for Arab-Muslim sensitivities that would not be afforded to Jews or other non-Muslims. It is not uncommon to hear suggestions that fears of a violent Arab “street” at least in part drive European, particularly French, political decisions. Even if Europeans do not see it as such, the subordination of Europe’s political and cultural discourses to Arab-Muslim demands—sometimes for fear of violent retribution—constitutes a form of dhimmitude from the classical Arab-Muslim perspective.
But it does not stand alone as a meme. As explained in chapter three, otherwise independent ideas can increase their fitness by becoming associated with other strong concepts, thus forming memeplexes that are less easily broken apart. In this case, the meme for dhimmitude often goes hand in hand with memes for anti-Semitism, even from the unlikely quarters of other potential dhimmi: Christians. There are numerous authors who effectively argue that the old form of anti-Semitism has not disappeared, rather it has evolved. Particularly in Europe, anti-Semitism of the “traditional” Nazi variety, which is not part of the accepted discourse, has given way to a “new” anti-Semitism. It is no less virulent or dangerous, but because it is led by the Arab-Muslim world (including the world of Muslim immigrants), it is tacitly approved of or excused by Western intellectual elites who are intellectually paralyzed by memes prohibiting criticism of minorities.
Rather than discussing the cultural and religious roots of Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism and how it blends with the traditional home-grown variety, the accepted discourse now downplays the seriousness of Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism by characterizing it as a natural consequence of Israeli injustices. When vitriolic statements or actions, considered unacceptable within Western circles come from Arab-Muslim sources, they are often permitted or dismissed as insignificant. This is classic cognitive dissonance, and it appears to have immobilized the Western intelligentsia.
This phenomenon appears at first glance to be more pro-Arab apologia than anti-Semitic prejudice, but the attitude typically extends toward a categorical condemnation of Israel and often circles back to burden European Jews, who are assumed responsible for perceived Israeli transgressions. Anecdotally, when Israeli security forces allegedly shot Muhammad al Dura, French Jews were commonly asked, “Why did you kill that boy?” Apparently, the epithet “sale Juif” (dirty Jew) is still lobbed with ease, and discussants defending Israel in public risk being “accused” of being Jewish or a Mossad agent.
Incidents like these stem from a permissive environment, one that reportedly led my NATO colleague, a French lieutenant colonel, to publicly let loose a string of toxic accusations about the “satanic” character of Israel, which “deserved everything it got.” It is apparent that the meme for anti-Semitism did not die at the end of World War II, and it can be considered a virile one that augments and thrives among dhimmi. From an ideological perspective, Christian anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist discourse may be an indicator of dhimmi-like submission—as would be mainstream silence over Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism—and some success.
Litmus Test for Arab-Muslim Minds
Within the memeplexes forming the Western discourse, it is assumed that all victims of inequality wish ultimately to achieve equality. This is not necessarily the case, however. The presence of anti-Semitism in minority communities illustrates that equality is a normative ideal not necessarily shared by all. In this case, anti-Semitism in Europe can serve as a Litmus test for global Muslim attitudes towards other minority groups, demonstrating either concurrence with or the success of Jihadists’ efforts. Traditionally carried out by right-wing, white groups such as the neo-Nazis, skinheads, or particularly fervent followers of France’s late Jean-Marie le Pen, anti-Semitism has been common in Europe since World War II, even if openly shunned by the mainstream culture. The recent advent of increased Muslim immigration in Europe, however, has ushered in a new wave of attacks and a different group of anti-Semitic perpetrators.
A State Department describes the changing nature and increasing prevalence of anti-Semitic attacks:
The increasing frequency and severity of anti-Semitic incidents since the start of the 21st century, particularly in Europe, has compelled the international community to focus on anti-Semitism with renewed vigor. Attacks on individual Jews and on Jewish properties occurred in the immediate post World War II period, but decreased over time and were primarily linked to vandalism and criminal activity. In recent years, incidents have been more targeted in nature with perpetrators appearing to have the specific intent to attack Jews and Judaism. These attacks have disrupted the sense of safety and well being of Jewish communities.
Mentioned briefly above, the French Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (National Consultative Commission for the Rights of Man, or CNCDH), states anti-Semitic attacks remain continually elevated near record levels and, despite Jews representing less than 1 percent of the French population, constitute 62 percent of all racist attacks in the country.  There are clear indications that European Muslims are conducting disproportionately large numbers of anti-Semitic attacks. According to the same organization, French police estimate Muslims conduct 26.8 percent of the attacks, although Muslims only constitute about 8 percent of the population. These figures are somewhat unreliable due to prohibitions on the collection of ethnic or religious data, however. It was mentioned in chapter two that one poll, whose reliability has not been determined, indicates 37 percent of British Muslims believe British Jews are “legitimate targets as part of the ongoing struggle for justice in the Middle East.” Additionally, 2006 turned out to be a record year for anti-Semitic attacks in the UK, linked partially to the August Israeli-Hezbollah war. According to one report, 76 out of 205 victims claimed they were attacked by individuals of ethnicities commonly associated with Muslims.
Anti-Semitic thought and practice appears to be far more prevalent in Muslim communities than among native Europeans. The carelessness with which young and older Muslim students sling Judeophobic epithets appeared to shock Education Minister Jean-Pierre Obin (see chapter four), and it indicates the hatred stems from far more than political disagreements over situations in the Middle East. Owing at least in part to the growing influence of radical imams, or “big brothers,” young Muslims increasingly believe that Jews deserve the lowest of positions in society, and they can clearly draw on well-established sources to legitimize that position. It is important to note that Christians and Jews effectively occupied the same social stratum beneath Muslims in classic times. There is a possibility that, in the long view, anti-Semitic attackers are also latent anti-Christian attackers, but the current dominance of Christian/secular culture in Europe prevents overt manifestations beyond riots and protests. European Jews, however, are an extreme minority and ill equipped to stop anti-Semitism. The prevalence of Arab-on-Jew attacks, therefore, may be another indicator of ideologists’ success in radicalizing their constituents.
Jihadist efforts to transform the accepted Western discourse have achieved at least some success by attracting and enlisting the support of moderates, and expertly employing taqiyya against unsuspecting targets. In the previous chapter we saw that cognitive warriors have created new realities with propaganda channeled through individuals bridging the cultural gap. That included, among others, advocate journalists and NGO members. In this chapter we see that organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR take the memetic offensive to the confines of Western society by advertising themselves as moderate interlocutors, ostensibly representing reasonable Islamists who seek “dialogue and understanding.” Many of these movements appear credible because they seem to originate within Western society and are believed to be distinct from “extreme” points of view. Others, like the Palestinian trade unions, at least present a front that is memetically acceptable to Western intellectuals.
The cognitive dissonance arises when evidence comes to light that is not consistent with the prevailing memetic paradigms, i.e. that jihadists are waging more than a defensive war and that seemingly moderate groups and the masses following them are not behaving in moderate ways. The western mind is paralyzed because the inconsistencies cannot be accounted for and, more importantly, they are incompatible with the prevailing universalist paradigm. It would be a shocking and perhaps painful experience for universalists to admit that not all humans are driven by the same motivations, or that humans do not all fundamentally think alike. Rather than memetically adapting, however, advocates of the accepted discourse retrench themselves and ignore the contravening evidence presented to them or diminish its significance.
Because that mentality leads to Western apology for behavior and thought considered unacceptable by Western standards, it can easily be considered an unwitting, though a willing, form of submission to jihadist goals. Bat Ye’or, therefore, is correct to call it a form of Dhimmitude. In one sense, this is the endstate militant ideologists seek to achieve, although it is nothing close to the desired magnitude. In another sense, this is the precise point at which identity entrepreneurs begin reinvesting their energy, starting the cycle anew. Success, so goes the saying, breeds more success. If European and American elites bend to the will jihadists, those jihadists will be able to advertise their successes to their own populations, thus feeding the ideological engine. Perhaps this is why the Obin report remarked that the French school system saw positive results when it refused to make concessions to the Islamists.
 Anna Geifman, “Stockholm Syndrome in the Media,” briefing presented through the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel, 17 December 2006.
 Schleifer, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies (Sussex Academic Press, 2006), p. 130.
 Schleifer, 68.
 Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 111.
 Boycott Israel, URL: , accessed 28 June 2007. See also, “Palestinian Academics Call for the International Academic Boycott of Israel,” Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, 7 July 2004, URL: , accessed 28 June 2007.
 “Slamming Israel, Giving Palestinians a Free Pass,” The Economist.com, 14 June 2007, URL: , accessed 28 June 2007. See also, “UNISON Pledges Support for Palestine,” UNISON, 20 June 2007, URL: , accessed 2 July 2007. See also Barry Grey, “British university teachers’ union votes for boycott of Israeli academics,” World Socialist Website, 21 June 2007, URL: , accessed 2 July 2007.
 “Muslim American Society: Dossier,” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, URL: , accessed 4 June 2008.
 U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” 22 May 1991, Government Exhibit 003-0003 3:04-CR-240-G.
 Transcript of FBI wire tap recording, presented at U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, Government Exhibit 016-0069 3:04-CR-240-G. See also U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, “Shura Council Report on the future of the Group: Work paper #1: A historical outline and the main issues,” 9 November 1991, Government Exhibit 003-0003 3:04-CR-240-G.
 “What they say about CAIR,” CAIR Pennsylvania, undated, URL: , accessed 4 June 2004.
 Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, Vol. 86 No. 2, 108.
 Ibid, 111.
 Transcript of FBI wire tap recording, presented at U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, Government Exhibit 016-0069 3:04-CR-240-G.
 U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, “Meeting Agenda for the Palestine Committee,” 30 July 1994, Government Exhibit 003-0078 3:04-CR-240-G.
 Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Same Roe and Lauri Cohen, “A rare look at secretive Brotherhood in America,” Chicagotribune.com, 19 September 2004, URL: , accessed 4 June 2008.
 Steve Emerson, “Leaders Illustrate CAIR’s Extremism, Anti-Semitism,” IPT News, 3 April 2008, URL: , accessed 5 June 2008.
 For another example, albeit a less academic one, see Susan Taylor Martin, “With CAIR, compromise complicated,” tampabay.com, 23 September 2007, URL: , accessed 5 June 2008.
 Mahmoud al-Zahar, “No Peace Without Hamas,” The Washington Post, online ed., 17 April 2008, URL: , accessed 20 June 2008.
 James Graff, “What’s Causing the Anti-Semitic Attacks?” Time in Partnership with CNN, 24 November 2003, URL: , accessed 13 February 2007.
 Department of State, Report on Global Anti-Semitism, 5 January 2006, URL: , accessed 20 June 2008.
 Paul Mitchell, “The Madrid bomb inquiry: Aznar continues his lies,” World Socialist Website, 4 December 2004, URL: , accessed 13 February 2007.
 Bat Ye’or, “Symposium: The Death of Multiculturalism?” FrontPageMagazine.com, 8 September 2006, URL: , accessed 11 February 2007.
 Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, (Cranbury: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005), 73-74.
 Ibid., 76-77.
 Richard Landes, Boston University Professor, interview by the author, December 2006. Anecdotally, a French air force captain—who ironically believed in Meyssan’s 9/11 conspiracy—confirmed for me that one does not typically side with Israel in public without derision. See also, Richard Landes, “Falling Asleep in the Skid: Reflections on France Part VI,” The Augean Stables, 29 March 2006, URL: , accessed 20 June 2008.
 Department of State, Report on Global Anti-Semitism, 5 January 2006, URL: , accessed 20 June 2008. The current French Jewish population rests just below 500,000, but it has been dropping by thousands each year because of the rise in discrimination. According to the Jewish Agency, roughly 2,500 Jews opted to depart France both in 2005 and 2006. As a point of comparison, approximately 2,300 Jews left the United States for Israel during each year of the same period, but the U.S. Jewish population totals nearly 5.6 million. The current trends in French Jewish emigration are nearly double those of the 1990s, and according to one poll, approximately one quarter of remaining French Jews were considering leaving the country as of 2003. Stuart A. Green, Lieutenant, USN, “(Student) National Intelligence Estimate,” unpublished research paper funded by JMIC, 30 January 2007.
 Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (National Advisory Commission for the Rights of Man), La Lutte Contre le Racisme et la Xénophobie, (The Fight Against Racism and Xenophobia), 2004, 9-10. Translation is mine.
 Populus, “Muslim Poll: December 2005,” December 2005, URL: , accessed 30 January 2007.
 Jeevan Vasagar, “Anti-Semitic Attacks Hit Record High Following Lebanon War,” Guardian Unlimited, 2 February 2007, URL: , accessed 11 February 2007.
 Jonny Paul, “UK: Anti-Semitic Attacks Up 31%,” Jerusalem Post, online ed., 1 February 2007, URL: , accessed 11 February 2007.