Karsenty vs. Enderlin: Baker vs. rekaB Street in action

Yesterday was the sixth hearing in the saga of France 2 and Charles Enderlin suing Philippe Karsenty for defamation in the French courts. In some senses it was something of an anti-climax. In others it was an amazing example of the clash between Baker and rekaB Streets. Indeed, the Société des journalistes (SNJ) and SNJ de France Télévisions both called on members to show their support for Enderlin, who was valiantly defending himself against Karsenty’s legal aggression, when in fact it is Enderlin and France2 who are using the courts to bully Karsenty into silence. Shades of Tuvia Grossman: we know who the aggressor must be, so we’re rallying around our wounded David, even when he’s a embarrassingly dim Goliath.

Karsenty went in loaded for bear, with a mock-up reconstruction of the site at Netzarim, and an extensive PPP full of videos. He went through all the evidence, starting with an very nice series of illustrations using the rushes to show how France2/Enderlin consistently use clearly staged footage as “news.” He then went through the entire dossier concerning the actual al Durah footage. At times it seemeda bit too exhaustive, and the judges seemed irritated by the PPP, but the arguments were excellent, and reflected a forensic mind that engages in identifying clues, and deriving conclusions from an analysis of the evidence.

Enderlin, on the other hand, seemed either completely out of his depth, or just supremely unconcerned. He did nothing but repeat things he’s said (and written) a thousand times, and when it was France2’s chance to respond to Karsenty, he sat passively while his lawyer showed five clips, four of which were just unedited replays of France2 news broadcasts on the matter (including totally irrelevant news about the tunnel under Mont Blanc and the Olympics in Sydney). It was as if they believed that in merely restating themselves, they proved themselves right. After Karsenty’s presentation, however, it was a stunning display of rekaB Street: the very scenes he had deconstructed as fakes, they were again playing as real. Even the judges seemed amused. The grand finale was Jamal al Durah showing his wounds just after Karsenty had showed that the wounds were not from the event (later confirmed by the medical forensic expert).

Enderlin seemed completely alone. He and his lawyer, Maitre Amblard, chic and shallow as ever, were alone at the dock (not even Guillaume Clement-Weill), no one from France2, whose new CEO was questioned about the al Durah affair by a senator at the time of his confirmation, and has, apparently decided to let Enderlin carry this one alone. Indeed, when France2’s “side” tried to show the videos, there was a technical fiasco which took 20 minutes to resolve (Karsenty even offered to show the footage they were having trouble with), trying the patience of the judges, before then trying their intelligence with meaningless material. Even Enderlin, in a passing glimmer of intelligence, seemed bored with his own side’s argument.

For those of us familiar with the material, it seemed like a rout. I even had a momentary flash of sympathy for how pathetic Enderlin was. In any serious court of informed and intelligent judgment, this was a romp: Karsenty sliced France2 to pieces, and France2 responded by putting the severed pieces back up on the screen as if they were whole.

But that means nothing in terms of the verdict. For the first time, the “Avocat generale” who speaks for the Parquet was critical of Karsenty, and chided him for his lack of prudence in criticizing Enderlin, emphasizing that the court was not here to decide the historical questions (i.e., what happened), but the question of Karsenty’s good faith (it being uncontested that his criticism of Enderlin was defamation of his honor). Given how – at least in the words of some major figures in the Jewish community – French justice is “politicized,” how much the whole establishment – media, politicians, judges – is locked up (verouillé), it’s perfectly possible that on April 3, the judges will decide in favor of the plaintiff, France2.

But that would just mean that one more court has planted its flag firmly on rekaB Street, and that the victims, in addition to Karsenty, will be the fabric of civil society in France, where citizens cannot criticize a rogue press lest it harm their unearned reputation. 

The event was live-blogged by JSS, and discussed in L’Orient le Jour.


44 Responses to Karsenty vs. Enderlin: Baker vs. rekaB Street in action

  1. “Given how – at least in the words of some major figures in the Jewish community – French justice is “politicized,” how much the whole establishment – <strong)media, politicians, judges – is locked up (verouillé), it’s perfectly possible that on April 3, the judges will decide in favor of the plaintiff, France2.”

    Greek justice (and political culture in general), has been been greatly influenced by its French counterpart, and i can attest that it is greatly politicized. It is my impression that the same is true for the whole of continental Europe. There seems to be a contrast with Anglo-American legal culture, where a defendant fighting the establishment has a good chance of winning, if she is on the right side of truth.

    “The outsider who threatens the establishment’s image must be “shortened””, this seems to be the ruling (literally!) maxim in assigning legal guilt.

    Yes, thing don’t bode well for Karsenty.

  2. Martin J. Malliet says:

    It very much feels like an anti-climax indeed. But there is some hope. Contrary to my expectation, the Public Ministry (avocat général) has not pleaded, as in the first appeal trial, in favour of upholding the first verdict (against Philippe Karsenty), which is a good sign. The PM has not pleaded in favour of overturning the first verdict either (in favour of Philippe Karsenty), which is not such a good sign. The PM has simply left the matter entirely to the sitting judges. But as the PM has correctly pointed out, the judges do not have to pronounce themselves on the “historical truth”, they only have to decide the “technical question” whether Philippe Karsenty had sufficient grounds to make his public criticism and accusation against France2/Enderlin in good faith. That shouldn’t be a decision too difficult to make in favour of Philippe Karsenty by independent judges.

    Because the opposite would be a very strange verdict saying something like: “There seem to be many reasons to doubt the historical truth of the story, but that is not our concern; our concern is the honour of France2/Enderlin, and that honour was definitely damaged by the excessive wording of Philippe Karsenty’s critical accusation.” I don’t think a decent judge, even a French one, is happily prepared to lend himself to such a travesty of justice.

    Publicity about the trial, especially international publicity, may still be very helpful, though, for the judges to keep their decency. As it stands, the whole thing is an insider thing, not a Dreyfus Affair. Andrew Gilligan has his work cut out for him, methinks, as he has a knack for uncovering that kind of charade in just 5 paragraphs. Where I need, well, many pages, as written for the other blog post.


    After that little victory for Philippe Karsenty, things could become really interesting, if Philippe Karsenty (and supporters) have the stomach to push on: using the protracted legal battle foisted on them by France2/Enderlin, and which by an appeal verdict in favour of Philippe Karsenty would be proven to have been nothing else but unfounded harassment to silence a legitimate media critic, to sue France2/Enderlin for libel, harassment and damages, to the amount of €13m (as argued in my comments on the other blog post).


  3. E.G. says:

    Here’s a third article (or Op.-ed):

    Much livelier than RL’s description.
    Don’t miss the comments!

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      Merci, E.G., pour le lien. C’est en effet à se taper le derrière au lustre, comme disent les Français. Je ne voudrais pas diminuer le mérite de Philippe Karsenty d’avoir mené ce combat de sa manière persévérante, mais on peut parfois avoir l’impression qu’il n’est pas tout à fait l’homme qu’il faut: en se concentrant tellement sur l’affaire Al Durah il oublie d’expliquer le tableau d’ensemble, quand c’est pourtant le tableau d’ensemble qui donne de la crédibilité à sa thèse dans l’affaire Al Durah en la rendant compréhensible. Cette manière d’agir et de parler comme dans une ‘cocotte-minute’ (l’image est de Nidra Poller) est souvent peu convaincante pour les non-avertis. Et cela vaut pour tout le combat – contre les partis-pris des médias dans leur manière d’informer sur le conflit ‘indéchiffrable’, les dangers du ‘punk djihadisme’, Eurabia et tout le reste.

      I had a conversation with Richard Landes and Nidra Poller in Paris, over lunch at the ‘As du Falafel’. I could hardly get a word in. When I tried to promote two of my ideas (making fun of islamists and their hadith about the rocks and trees, which is counting on Jews being stupid enough to hide behind those disloyal rocks and trees when they have better options; sueing islamists for libel when they call us infidels: let them just try and prove that in the court of public opinion), I didn’t get anywhere, at all. As if they believed I hadn’t yet understood how serious the matter is we’re talking about. Well, I felt misunderstood myself then. The food was nice though.

      Not very convincing alarmist style:

      You banging on the door of your friend’s appartment door on the 6th floor, shouting: “Get out of here, there’s a fire on the second floor!”
      Friend: “I can see no smoke, I can smell no smoke, you must be out your mind!”

      More effective ‘leading from behind’ style:

      You after having the drink your friend offered you: “In coming up I saw a fire in the 2nd floor appartment.”
      Friend: “What? Was the firebrigade there?”
      You: “Not yet, but I suppose they’re on their way, they must have called them, at the rate the fire was going.”
      Friend in a panic: “What? No firebrigade? Let’s take no chances and call them again!”

      • Hi there Martin. Two minor objections:

        “sueing islamists for libel when they call us infidels”

        I fear this would give them a plausible excuse to present us as intolerant to the wider western public. “Words such as “infidel” don’t really hurt, so why are they overreacting? they are haters”, that’s how i would spin the whole thing if i was advising the Islamists. And i would also make sure to draw an equivalence between this hypothetical western legal reaction to the use of the term “infidel” and the Muslim reaction to cartoons: “Hey, they are as intolerant as the Islamists!”.

        “making fun of islamists and their hadith about the rocks and trees, which is counting on Jews being stupid enough to hide behind those disloyal rocks and trees when they have better options”

        I think that if we laugh at them, we assign to them the role of the victim: the western public might feel sorry for them, instead of waking up to the real threat the Islamists represent. We cannot really perceive someone as a threat, if we find him laughable.

        PS. In a week’s time i start some online courses in Philosophy with the University of Edinburgh through the COURSERA program! 80,000 registered students up to now!

        • Martin J. Malliet says:

          I admit that I haven’t thought it all through. What was at the back of my mind is ‘normalisation vs demonisation’, and dialogue, not necessarily with the islamists alone. Getting out of the ‘pessure cooker’ as Nidra Poller calls it. Making fun of senseless extremist talk must be part of that. (Senseless extremist and violent acts are an entirely different matter and nothing to be made fun of, that’s for sure.)

          And such a grave accusation as ‘unbeliever’ directed at real people (not dead prophets), especially when it is made so offhandedly as it is done by islamists, is intolerable. Intolerance is one of those strange words that have lost their original meaning, so that one can now say something like: “There’s nothing intolerant about not tolerating intolerable behaviour.” Even without having it all thought through, I’m quite certain that this is no small matter: I don’t accept from any human person a judgement on my beliefs, and I don’t see why anybody should. That’s what tolerance is about after all, and intolerance in the now dominant secondary meaning of ‘not tolerating what is tolerable’.

          • Martin J. Malliet says:

            “The experience of divine presence, when symbolized, is burdened with the historical concreteness of the symbols. No symbolization is adequate to the ineffability of the divine Beyond. Hence, when you are a believer on the level of symbols, you become an “infidel” to the ineffable truth of divine reality; and when your faith is constituted by your relation to the ineffably divine, you become an “infidel” on the level of the symbols. Again in Western language, the problem looks to me very much like that of the fides quaerens intellectum, of the faith on the level of imaginative symbolism moving beyond its acceptance of the symbols, through meditative contemplation, towards the understanding of the experiences which endow the symbols with their sense.” – Eric Voegelin

          • Martin J. Malliet says:

            “The question of metaphysical blindness. You tend to see in such blindness a fate that befalls a human being. I rather tend to emphasize personal guilt. As far as my side of the dichotomy is concerned, I can only talk of a ‘tendency’; I have not been able to achieve much clarity in the context of this question.” In spite of his failure to achieve clarity, Voegelin suggests two explanations for his ‘tendency’. First, he feels that the representatives of ‘metaphysical blindness’ show in their writings that, in fact, they are not blind. They simply choose to ignore that they can see and hence are responsible for their blindness. But his second explanation is more important because he refers to ‘personal motives’: “In every visage of a positivistic professor or liberal pastor I see the visage of the SS-murderer that he causes.”

        • Martin J. Malliet says:

          PS: Another piece of advice, coming from Arthur Schopenhauer: reading a lot is OK, but don’t forget to take the time to think for yourself. Mulling it over in your head while lying on your back is a necessary phase in that. Taking a good night’s sleep is another. But the most important phase is writing it out: choosing the words and arranging them into sentences, with each sentence making a clear statement that adds to the one that went before (that’s from VS Naipaul’s ‘Rules for Beginners’ urging you to get rid of the bad language habits picked up at the university).

          • Martin

            I fully concur. Leaving aside the sleep (which i cherish!), i engage in all three steps, but in a very imbalanced way: i am way too high on thinking the issues for myself, but very low on writing down the result of this process.

      • Nidra Poller says:

        Martin, you claim you couldn’t get a word in edgewise. That’s not exactly true. You apparently managed to interject the “pressure cooker” image and then attribute it to me. You are so entranced with it, that I see you already used it twice. If you recorded the conversation and can prove I said such a thing, I will be astonished. It’s not a good image. If I said anything–positive or negative– in your presence about Philippe Karsenty it was unwise. But then, I am not a high profile political figure and you are not a hotshot reporter grabbing an off the cuff remark and running with it to the goal. I am a journalist and deserving of respect.
        That includes not going public about a chance meeting with me, and not quoting me as if we had watched over the flocks together.

        • Martin J. Malliet says:

          Nidra, I would be ready to apologise for unduly quoting you, but I haven’t quoted you at all, not on Philippe Karsenty, not on anything else! All opinions expressed by me were expressed as my own, and not as somebody else’s. The image of the ‘pressure cooker’ I attributed to you, because I got it from you (from your talk at the 2012 Brussels ICLA conference). I continue to think that it is quite an accurate image for the point I wanted to make. And isn’t this surprising exchange we’re having right now a further illustration of that point? France2/Enderlin’s attorney didn’t refrain from calling Karsenty’s criticism a “torrent of mud”! That’s spin, of course, at least to some extent. But it also shows how far perceptions are apart on what is indeed a most serious matter.

  4. Harold Taback says:

    Protecting “the establishment” is only part of the problem. The French including their judges are still as anti-semitic as ever.

  5. mika says:

    The long and short of it is that it was staged theater. The MSM lies and the foreign controlled Israeli gov mafia is complicit in this staged theater. The Israeli people know this, the world knows this. People are becoming more and more savvy; they are learning the truth. This can only mean one thing: the banks the corporation the media the schools the courts the military and all the other institutions of the gov mafia control matrix are losing legitimacy and patronage.

  6. Martin J. Malliet says:

    “It should also be remembered that Dostoevsky’s ‘truth’ was anti-Thomistic, in the sense that Dostoevsky rejected the unity of God’s creation and chose to believe that while on one level, 2+2=4, on another level this is not so. His famous saying that ‘if Christ proved to be outside the truth [he] would rather go with Christ than with the truth’ is an attractive tip of an iceberg of mendacities that this kind of attitude engenders. As St. Thomas pointed out, there is no separation between intuitive truth and rational truth. The end result of a refusal to accept truth’s universality is the phenomenon of Grigorii Rasputin, a holy fool and a debauched pseudo-monk who played a large role at the court of the last emperor and empress of Russia. Rasputin was a man capable of utter self-abasement, and yet he also displayed resentful pride.”

    From a very good article by Ewa Thompson (who has more interesting things to say on nationalism, post-colonialism, etc): “Reflections on errors in some Western interpretations of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov”.


    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      This was meant as an aside in reply to Mika, but I made a mistake when posting it.

      • mika says:

        I don’t know where you’re going with this, but from my understanding of Dostoevsky’s writings, his basic philosophical concern was that of religious and scientific determinism. This is crystallized in his Notes From Underground and The Brothers Karamazov (The Grand Inquisitor). Dostoevsky rejected both the Vatican Utopians and the Rational Utopians, because Dostoevsky correctly understood human nature: “The fact is, gentlemen, it seems there must really exist something that is dearer to almost every man than his greatest advantages, or (not to be illogical) there is a most advantageous advantage (the very one omitted of which we spoke just now) which is more important and more advantageous than all other advantages, for the sake of which a man if necessary is ready to act in opposition to all laws; that is, in opposition to reason, honour, peace, prosperity—in fact, in opposition to all those excellent and useful things if only he can attain that fundamental, most advantageous advantage which is dearer to him than all.” That being the preservation of his free will.*

        *(Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 1860-1865 By Joseph Frank)

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      Reason also is part of human nature, whereas Dostoevsky seems to understand it as part of a determinism against which he wants to preserve man’s free will. That’s something I hadn’t understood so clearly before. Somehow these philosophical strugglers always seem to miss the individual, of which the discovery is quite recent, as Nietzsche pointed out. And often very uncertain. Rationality isn’t about ends, or at least not about collective ends that ought to be accepted by all reasonable individuals, as Dostoevsky seems to think. However, it is very reasonable to say that ends can only be chosen by individuals and therefore cannot be in contradiction with man’s free will. If there is an ultimate determinism, it’s the one Schopenhauer meant when saying that “one cannot will one’s will”. The choice of his ends is what makes the individual what he is, and he cannot very well choose to be what he is not.

      • mika says:

        Free will is a synonym for freedom. Moreover, the matrix of deceit and control is just that. No one is fooled. We are not sheep, Martin. That’s what most if not all of your philosophers seem to forget.

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      “No one is fooled?” Maybe. But what is the answer then to Etienne de la Boétie’s empirical question (in his ‘Discours de la servitude volontaire’): “How is it that the many let themselves so easily be governed by the few?” (My own tentative answer, derived from Heinrich Popitz’s ‘Prozesse der Machtbildung’: the organisational advantage of the exploitative few, who are fully focused on exploiting the many, whereas the many who are exploited are directing their attention elsewhere, and not primarily on defending themselves against the exploiters.)

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      That is a very long answer. But isn’t it simply saying that for people to defend themselves successfully against oppressive government the necessary and sufficient condition is that not enough of them let themselves be fooled by it (i.e. enough of them keep the true faith)? Well, I would go along with that, there surely is no silver bullet. I paste hereafter some notes I’ve written earlier and that show how all of this connects with the purpose of Richard Landes’s blog.

      [I had never heard of Frank Chodorov, and I also don’t know much about Henry George; but there is a connection with Franz Oppenheimer and that looks good.]

      On the unlikelihood of a working civil society (as opposed to a prime-divider society)

      (1) The basic order of human conviviality is that of a ‘civil society’, and it is not so improbable as historical evidence might suggest; of course, it is basic and effective only as long as the ‘balance of power’ requirement is fulfilled (one man against another man), because then the asymmetry between aggression and defense as pointed out by Anthony de Jasay can produce the healthy effect of making civil society self-enforcing.

      (The aggressor has the choice between aggression and keeping the peace, whereas the victim of aggression has the choice between violent self-defense and submission without violence. With a ‘balance of power’, the likelihood of the first alternative being chosen by the victim is great, and so is the risk taken by the aggressor.)

      (2) The prime-divider alternative destroying the basic order of civil society is to be explained by some shift in the ‘balance of power’ that makes aggression less risky and more profitable, and the most obvious cause for such a shift in the balance of power we can think of is ‘organisation’: the aggressor only needs a minimal effort of organisation in order to achieve ‘overwhelming force’ against the victims (submitting them one village at a time and one after the other, so to speak), whereas the victims would need to make an effort of organising an effective defense against the aggressors that is much greater (i.e. less likely).

      See Heinrich Popitz’s basic examples (in: “Prozesse der Machtbildung”), of which the most basic is the ‘deckchair example’.

      [Heinrich Popitz has many interesting insights, but he has no feeling at all for the natural law approach, which necessarily distinguishes between unlawful coercion (force, power) and lawful coercion (competition). So according to Heinrich Popitz power is simply everywhere. This goes toegether with the idea that society and culture is about shared norms and conventions, with norms being an expression of a command-obey relationship even when it is not recognised as such because we supposedly all share the same normative outlook and the norms that go with it. Although he makes the interesting observation that it often suffices that the ideological justification of power is sufficiently convincing to those in power themselves for it to make a lasting impression on their victims.]

      Etienne de la Boétie: ‘Discours de la servitude volontaire’
      Franz Oppenheimer: ‘Der Staat’ (on the ‘economic means’ and the ‘political means’ for furthering one’s interests, and especially the insight that there is nothing in between, see also Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem)
      Anthony de Jasay: ‘The State’; ‘Social Contract, Free Ride – A Study of the Public-Goods Problem’

      [Franz Oppenheimer was the predecessor of Karl Mannheim as the first Chair of sociology at the university of Frankfurt; Ludwig Erhard (who under Adenauer singlehandedly liberated prices against the will of the American authorities of occupation) was one of his students. Anthony de Jasay is the one who turns around the argument of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ for a ‘social contract’: not the free society leads inevitably to prisoners’ dilemmas creating a need for a government enforcing the superior cooperative solution, it is politics and government themselves that give rise to a prisoners’ dilemma preventing the superior cooperative outcome of a free society from being implemented, i.e. politics as the ever present temptation to use political power (force) for achieving what cannot be obtained by negotiation.]

      So in the end it seems to me that the successful emergence of a civil polity is both a question of culture (the attitudes and skills of a critical mass of the population that supports a civil society on a natural law foundation) and a question of power logistics (the population succeeds in the uphill struggle of organising an effective defense of the lawful order against the exploitative criminals even when the latter call themselves the legitimate government).

      ‘Democratic politics’ then presents a new type of danger to the civil polity: the danger of politically undermining the natural lawful order, but this time not in the interest of one ruling class, but in the interest of everybody, i.e. in a permanent ‘democratic’ struggle for social (or distributive) justice, on which by its very nature no consensus can ever be reached, so that the struggle can go on indefinitely, continously replacing one offending inequality by another.

      Eric Voegelin somewhere explains (and I think he got that idea from the Greeks) that in every society there are three classes of people: (1) those who know by themselves what the natural order of the human world is; (2) those who can and will understand it when it is shown to them; (3) and those who cannot and will not understand it even when it is shown to them (the stulti, fools, criminals). ‘Critical mass’ then is a concept that is relevant for both class 1 and class 3. Not enough of class 1, or too many of class 3, have both the capacity of destroying the human order of conviviality (aka ‘civil society’).

      The Western world, obviously and for quite some time already, hasn’t enough of class 1, so that the continous disorientation of class 2 may endanger its reproduction and contribute to the growth of class 3. In the developing world, and the Islamic world in particular, the same dynamics apply, and with uncontrolled population growth, the outcome is evidently much worse.

      • mika says:

        I’m not sure how you managed to go so far astray, I thought Chodorov made it very plain to comprehend. Anyway, I will condense it for you into very simple terms, which hopefully even you will not manage to go off on esoteric tangents that have little to nothing to do with the point being conveyed. What Chodorov is saying is very simple. Government is a racket. And the more centralized it is, the bigger and more outrageous the racket. That is the basic message of the Hebrew Bible. It is also what all great writers and honest thinkers understand almost intuitively. Feodor Dostoevsky, Franz Kafka, H.G. Wells, George Orwell, Aldus Huxley, etc., they all understood this and warned against this.

        This is very relevant to us today, and to me as an Israeli, because Israel — the quintesential Nation State — is at the crosshairs for destruction. The old Roman Imperialists are resurrecting the old Roman Empire into a global empire, aka, the NEW WORLD ORDER. Global standardization and centralization is the order of the day. Nation States are to be dismantled and eliminated so as to facilitate more streamlined centralization and better streamlined thieving. If you don’t understand this, you are dumb to the basic forces at work in the world. Capish?

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      Leaving aside for the moment the question of who is dumbest here, I thought we were searching for an answer to Etienne de la Boétie’s question: the necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful defense against oppressive government (“the forces at work in the world” as you call it). Remaining faithful to methodological individualism, critical masses of people possessing the appropriate skills and attitudes are surely part of that answer. The logistics of power (i.e. of unlawful coercion) I think is another (and a very wide field, I admit). My impression is that Frank Chodorov and other similar writers are a bit short on how “the forces at work in the world” are indeed doing the work. So are conspiracy theorists. (As yourself?) Anthony de Jasay asking the question “what would you do if you were the state?” is a lot more insightful on the predicament of state power. And there is nothing esoteric or tangential about these insights. His 1985 book ‘The State’ is available online:


      A conspiracy theory I had never heard of is that of the sinking of the Titanic by the Jesuit Order (the Vatican)! The purpose of the conspiracy was to unobtrusively (!) eliminate some wealthy opponents of the Federal Reserve System.


      Conspiracy theories are fairy tales inducing the facile belief that all that is needed is to “cut off the head of the snake”. So I stay with Joseph Conrad less farfetched explanation for the sinking of the Titanic – a profitable ship as vulnerable as a gigantic shoe box on the high seas. The captain’s mistake of trying to avoid the iceberg rather than running the ship right into it he thinks was excusable under the circumstances.

      • mika says:

        I’ve provided you the answer on numerous posts here and throughout the blog. But you’re completely deaf dumb and blind to it. I will give you the courtesy that this is due to severely debilitating emotional programming rather than intellectual deficiency, although quite honestly I feel I’m being extremely generous.

        Again,.. the way to defend against the government mafia is to NOT lend it any kind of legitimacy through any kind of active or passive support. This means disengagement from its institutions of power and control.

        You counteract the gov mafia by throughly delegitimizing it by YOUR ACTIONS. As best you can you do not participate in the system. You boycott of their banks, their corporations, their military, their schools, their media, their “history” books, their religious institutions, their courts, their system of government, their NGOs, their poison foods, their divide & conquer tactics, etcetera.

        As best you can, you “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” Just as Yeshua bar-Yehosef did, you spread this knowledge and again you vote with your feet. You don’t go to Tzippori and Caesarea and other such towns, even though they are major population centers and are near by, because Tzippori and Caesarea are Greco-Roman gov mafia abominations. And when you go to Jerusalem you disrupt the gov mafia money changers, because money is the key weapon of the Imperialists — the government mafia and their slave plantations.

      • mika says:

        Conspiracy theories are fairy tales inducing the facile belief that all that is needed is to “cut off the head of the snake”.

        You don’t need to to do anything other than avoid “the snake”. Let it starve itself to death. Without our participation the snake will eat its own tail. Without our participation there is no snake.

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      There’s no need to get impatient, I heard you. And I understand that your answer is one of critical mass (of people not letting themselves be fooled by the ‘conspiracy’). That was also Etienne de la Boétie’s answer: “Soyez résolus à ne plus servir, et vous voilà libres.” Around 1548. Well, it is an uphill battle, to be sure. And patience is a virtue, as everybody knows. – About the Jesuits: they haven’t contacted me yet, although I would like to be hired by the Vatican, as a diplomatic chargé de mission, to go and talk to Chancellor Angela Merkel about EU governments having become accessories to a crime, since 1947-48.

      • mika says:

        EU governments having become accessories to a crime, since 1947-48

        HA! Chief criminals becoming “accessories” to a crime. Talk about a confused mind. Oh brother!

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      “Confused mind?” From the perspective of a believer in the ‘single snake hypothesis’ most certainly. But why would there only be one snake? And to get hired, some diplomacy is required.

      • mika says:

        Yes, a confused mind. One does not confuse chief criminals with accessories to a crime. I gave you the benefit of the doubt and did not ascribe sinister motives to such “confusion”. It would not bother me in the least to correct this.

        “But why would there only be one snake?” Because EVERYTHING points to this. It’s been choreographed to perfection. And that means one head at the top of it all. The nazis, the commies, the zionists, the fascists, the monarchists, the secret agencies, the secret societies, the islamists, the corrupt religious sects,.. ALL snakes belonging to the same Vatican Medusa.

        But maybe you know different.

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      I don’t know different. I just know how to keep in mind the difference between what we know and what we believe as a working hypothesis. Whereas you don’t seem to be bothered by classifying those who don’t share your working hypothesis as criminals (ascribing to them “sinister motives” in a ‘procès d’intention’). And that is exactly what makes conspiracy theorists (including yourself) dangerous. You should go and read that book edited by Richard Landes “The Paranoid Apocalypse: A Hundred-Year Retrospective on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion “(Elie Wiesel Center for Judaic Studies).

      • mika says:

        Well then, if you don’t know different then there’s no argument or debate. The battle of ego which you seem to insist upon, I’ll leave for you to battle on your own.

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      I’m quite happy to leave it at that as well. Although I didn’t get to the conclusion I wanted: I don’t know different, but you don’t know either, you just believe you do.

      “If it were not for the fact that we ought to be reasonable, it would not be unreasonable to deny that anything ought to be believed because it is a fact.” – Frank Van Dun in “Economics and the Limits of Value-Free Science” (1986)

      • mika says:

        I’m sorry, Martin, but your reply is yet another confused reply by a confused mind.

        You say that you’re quite happy to leave it at that, but you don’t. You continue with your nonsense. You quote some convoluted idiotic passage that claims that it is a “fact that we ought to be reasonable”. Sorry, but that we ought to be reasonable is not a fact, it’s an opinion. Again, you seem to be unable to discern the most basic of things.

        What is a fact is that there are thousands of brilliant thinkers, writers, historians, politicians, etc., who have wrote thousands of books and testimonials attesting to the machinations of the Vatican and its proxies. They all convey the same conclusion. What is a fact is that the Vatican seeks world domination and dominion over Jerusalem, and always has. What is a fact is that the Vatican hides behind its court “Jooos”, that they have promoted to positions of prominence, to scapegoat and genocide the Jewish people. What is fact is that the more the Vatican does this, the more likely its slight of hand will become widely exposed and understood for what it is. It’s already becoming so. As the Chinese say, you keep going up to the mountain, sooner or later you’ll meet the tiger. That’s just statistical fact, Martin.

    • Martin J. Malliet says:

      “If it were not true that we ought to be reasonable, it would not be unreasonable to deny that anything ought to be believed because it is true.” – My rephrasing of the Frank Van Dun quote.

      So this is not some idiotic convoluted passage, it’s a quote from a remarkable article that should be read in his entirety. And I haven’t seen any discussion of Max Weber’s problem that comes anywhere near it.

      More selected quotes from that article:

      “That we ought to be reasonable is the most fundamental, the most indubitable fact of all – the fact without which nothing else can be a fact. And this fact, let it be noted, is expressed by means of a proposition that is neither a mere formal tautology nor an empirically falsifiable proposition – a characteristic it shares with such other facts as that we are rational beings or that we are purposive agents.”

      “Against Weber we must accept that there can be no fact without values and no objective or transsubjective facts without objective or transsubjective values. Science does not require a leap of faith: there can be a science of ethics and therefore also an ethics of science that is quite objective if it conforms to the normative facts as discussed by the science of ethics. Still, ethical judgments are not infallible. Although it is nonsense to say that the findings of a science are “value-free,” it makes perfectly good sense to claim that no prejudice should be allowed to survive in the development of a science of ethics. There is, then, a sense in which the doctrine of Wertfreiheit applies to ethics too-and, if I am right, it is the same sense in which it applies to every science. And to say that we ought not to tolerate the survival of prejudice, is but another way of saying that we ought to be reasonable. And if it is the self-imposed mission of science to effect the movement from prejudice to informed, rational judgment, then we need have no qualms about affirming the objective ethical value of the scientific enterprise.”

      “It would perhaps be better to drop the term Wertfreiheit altogether, and to speak only of “freedom from prejudice.” Science represents the movement from prejudice to informed, rational judgment. This formulation does not prejudge the question of whether value judgments can or cannot embody scientific knowledge. In addition, it reminds us of the fact that scientific knowledge need not consist only of propositions of the form “We know that it is true that. . .” Such knowledge is the exception rather than the rule. Scientific knowledge consists almost entirely of propositions of the form “It is true that we do not know. . .” and “We know that it is not true. . . ” This interpretation of the Wertfreiheit ideal is far removed from the Weberian version, which was based on the thesis that all value judgments are ultimately and irremediably and necessarily irrational, merely subjective prejudices. It is safe to say, however, that most scientists, while recognizing Weber as a champion of Wertfreiheit and remaining firmly (and justifiably) skeptical of the rhetorical argumentation of moralists and politicians, would probably refuse to make the leap into Weberian value-nihilism. And they could refuse for the good scientific reason that it would require some sort of “impossibility theorem” to justify Weber’s move from the undisputed heterogeneity of the problems of ethics and those of, say, physics, or geometry, or economics, to the conclusion that there can be no science of ethics. Weber did not supply an impossibility theorem, nor did anyone else. Indeed, on the interpretation of Wertfreiheit given here, this Weberian leap itself violates the canon of Wertfreiheit because it denies any scientist qua scientist the right even to attempt an investigation of the validity of value judgments-and also because it is a prime example of a competent scientist using his reputation as a scientist to lend authority to a thesis that is not “scientific” at all. As Weber himself pointed out, it is not even permissible for a scientist to say that the search for knowledge and truth, the life of reason and decision based on knowledge, is objectively good, or that science is a worthwhile vocation-or even that it may be possible one day to discover the truth or validity of these judgments.”

      “It may seem strange that Plato, the undisputed master of the dialogue as understood here, failed to draw any political conclusions from it. His philosopher-kings did not engage in dialogue, and they had no place in their cities for the institution of the dialogue. Even Plato’s second-best solution, as presented in The Laws, has no room for the institution of the dialogue: its aim is to arrest evolution (i.e., further decline and corruption) by a strict enforcement of discipline based on traditional, not-to-be-questioned laws. In his attempt to rescue the good city from the effects of sophistry and demagoguery, Plato was willing to sacrifice the Socratic dialogue as a model of human interaction, and to uphold the very nonhuman ideal of nonargumentative knowledge. There can, however, be a human history of science only where there are no philosopher-kings; only where the principle of philosophy, i.e., the dialogue as a political institution, with its jealous regard for the right of all people to act on their own judgment, prevents all philosophers or scientists from consolidating their eminence or leadership among their followers into a legal authority that cannot tolerate dissent.”

      “Economics and the Limits of Value Free Science”, Reason Papers 11(1986), p. 17 – 32

      Frank Van Dun has another one on David Hume’s “an ought doesn’t follow from an is”, which is about the same problem as the one on Max Weber.

      “Can We Be Free If Reason Is the Slave of the Passions?”, The Freeman, october 2007, p. 31 – 38

      Bibliography of Frank Van Dun with links:


      • mika says:

        Martin, that passage is defective at its foundation. I’m not going to participate with you in chimpanzee mental acrobatics to make it un-so. It is what is it. As for Plato. Plato is evil degenaracy, deceit, and control. His philosophy is a blueprint for tyranny, theft, murder. Nazism and all the other sick murderous isms that prey(ed) on the world, all have their roots in Plato.

  7. […] Professor Richard Landes is blogging his observations from the Paris courtroom, where French activist Philippe Karsenty and […]

  8. […] Professor Richard Landes is blogging his observations from the Paris courtroom, where French activist Philippe Karsenty and […]

  9. mika says:

    Conspiracy theories are fairy tales inducing the facile belief that all that is needed is to “cut off the head of the snake”.

    Here’s a conspiracy fact: In 1922, just after the Bolshevik counter-revolution, Stalin readmitted the Society of Jesus back into Russia. The Jesuit Order had been expelled by Czar Alexander I in 1820. This hidden fact does not make sense if one follows the official gov mafia narrative. Of-course, that’s why such facts are kept hidden. But it goes to show that what one learns from the gov mafia propaganda outlets is often nothing more than deceit and contrived theater for unsuspecting naifs and ignoramuses.

  10. […] Enderlin and France2’s news reporting before the court, and France2’s only answer was to replay the news reports that used the staged footage Karsenty had just shown to the court. Even the judges seemed puzzled at the lack of substance (and his technical incompetence – unlike […]

  11. […] Enderlin and France2’s news reporting before the court, and France2’s only answer was to replay the news reports that used the staged footage Karsenty had just shown to the court. Even the judges seemed puzzled at the lack of substance (and his technical incompetence – unlike […]

  12. […] Enderlin and France2’s news reporting before the court, and France2’s only answer was to replay the news reports that used the staged footage Karsenty had just shown to the court. Even the judges seemed puzzled at the lack of substance (and his technical incompetence – unlike […]

  13. […] Professor Richard Landes continues blogging France 2 and Charles Enderlin’s lawsuit against French activist Philippe […]

  14. […] Professor Richard Landes is blogging his observations from the Paris courtroom, where French activist Philippe Karsenty and […]

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