ENVY

A Theory of Social Behaviour

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Throughout history, in all stages of cultural development, in most languages and as members of widely differing societies, men have recognized a fundamental problem of their existence and have given it specific names: the feeling of envy and of being envied.

Envy is a drive which lies at the core of man's life as a social being, and which occurs as soon as two individuals become capable of mutual comparison. This urge to compare oneself invidiously with others can be found in some animals but in man it has acquired a special significance. Man is an envious being who, were it not for the social inhibitions aroused within the object of his envy, would have been incapable of developing the social systems to which we all belong today. If we were not constantly obliged to take account of other men's envy of the extra pleasure that accrues to us as we begin to deviate from a social norm, 'social control' could not function.

Man the envier can, however, overshoot the mark and arouse or release inhibitions which have a retarding effect on the ability of a group to adapt to new environmental problems. Envy can also turn man to destruction. Almost all the fragmentary literature which has hitherto dealt with envy (essays, belles-lettres, philosophy, theology, psychology) has constantly seen its destructive, inhibitory, futile and painful element. In all the cultures of mankind, in all proverbs and fairytales, the emotion of envy is condemned. The envious person is universally exhorted to be ashamed of himself. And yet his existence, or the belief in his ubiquity, has at the same time always provided enough latent apprehension of other people's views to allow a system of social controls and balances to evolve.
Although some schools of modern psychology have practically deleted the word 'envy' from their vocabulary, as if it simply did not exist as a primary source of motivation, the available evidence leaves no doubt whatever of its universality. In almost all languages, from those of the simplest primitive peoples to those of the Indo-European group, in Arabic, Japanese and Chinese, there is invariably a term to indicate envy or the envious person. Proverbs of the most varied cultures deal with it in hundreds of different forms. Aphorists and philosophers have touched on it. For instance envy had a particular significance for Kierkegaard, who even attributed envy to those who aroused envy in others. In fiction envy often plays a role and sometimes a major one; and every one of us has encountered envy in his own life. It is the great regulator in all personal relationships: fear of arousing it curbs and modifies countless actions.

Considering the key role played by envy in human existence, and that nothing new in the way of conceptual apparatus was needed in order to recognize it, it is truly remarkable how few works have dealt exclusively with it. They include an essay by Francis Bacon; a short book by the Frenchman, Eugène Riga, written in the late 1920s, and a Russian novella, Envy, of the same date; besides these, there is a novel by the almost forgotten nineteenth-century French author, Eugène Sue, several aphorisms in Nietzsche and a study by Max Scheler which in fact deals more with the special case of resentment than envy proper.

This book may disturb many readers, including those with widely differing opinions on social and political issues. I believe, though, that I can demonstrate two things: first, that envy is much more universal than has so far been admitted or even realized, indeed that envy alone makes any kind of social co-existence possible; secondly, however, I believe envy as the implicit or explicit fulcrum of social policy to be much more destructive than those who have fabricated their social and economic philosophy out of envy would care to admit.

That our fellow man is always potentially envious—and the probability as well as the degree of his envy increases in ratio to his propinquity—is one of the most disturbing, often one of the most carefully concealed yet most basic facts of human existence at all levels of cultural development. The inadequacies, the historical limitations of so many respected social philosophies and economic theories, become obvious when it is realized how much they depend on the assumption that human envy is the outcome of arbitrary, haphazard and purely temporary circumstances—in particular that it is the result of gross inequalities and may disappear once these are removed: in other words, that it can be permanently cured.

Most of the achievements which distinguish members of modern, highly developed and diversified societies from members of primitive societies—the development of civilization, in short—are the result of innumerable defeats inflicted on envy, i.e., on man as an envious being. And what Marxists have called the opiate of religion, the ability to provide hope and happiness for believers in widely differing material circumstances, is nothing more than the provision of ideas which liberate the envious person from envy, the person envied from his sense of guilt and his fear of the envious. Correctly though Marxists have identified this function, their doctrines have remained blind and naïve when faced with the solution of the problem of envy in any future society. It is hard to see how the totally secularized and ultimately egalitarian society promised us by socialism can ever solve the problem of the residual envy latent in society.

However, it is not only the determining philosophical and ideological content of a culture but also social structures and processes, themselves in part supported by or derived from ideological factors, which exert an influence on the part played by envy.

The world from the viewpoint of the envier

We must begin by looking at the world as seen by the envious man. A certain predisposition to envy is part of man's physical and social equipment, the lack of which would, in many situations, simply result in his being trampled down by others. We use our latent sense of envy when, for instance, we examine social systems for their efficiency: before joining an association or firm we try to discern whether it has any intrinsic structure which might arouse strong envy in ourselves or in others. If so, it is probably an organization which is not very well adapted to particular functions. In the recent past a few American colleges and universities have tried to attract able academic celebrities as professors by offering salaries perhaps twice as high as those earned by the
people who have never regarded themselves as social scientists have
pre-scientific origin. For centuries, indeed for millennia, countless
light on more things than people have hitherto been prepared to admit or even to see.

Envy has the advantage of other modern terms such as ambivalence,
relative deprivation, frustration or class war, in that as a concept it has a
pre-scientific origin. For centuries, indeed for millennia, countless
people who have never regarded themselves as social scientists have

Consistently and unanimously observed a form of behaviour—envy—which they described in words that were often the etymological equivalents of the same words in other languages.¹

An exhaustive study of envy in its active and passive roles in social
history is important not only because this emotion and motivational
syndrome are crucial in individual human life; it is also relevant to
politics, since the right or wrong assessment of the phenomenon of envy,
the under- or over-estimation of its effects, and above all the unformed
hope that we can so order our social existence as to create people or
societies devoid of envy, are all considerations of immediate political
significance, particularly where economic and social policies are
concerned.

If envy were no more than one of many psychological states such as
homesickness, desire, worry, disgust, avarice and so on, one might be
prepared to admit that on the whole most people know what envy is and
what it involves. It would still be a rewarding task, and one of great
importance to many fields of study such as child psychology, educational
science or psychotherapy to classify systematically all that we know
about envy and to develop it methodically into a theory. This book is also
an attempt to do that. But a proper appraisal of man's potential for envy,
a realization of its universality and persistence, could in years to come
determine how much common sense is exercised in the domestic social
and economic policies of parliamentary democracies, as well as in their
dealings with the so-called developing nations. As we shall show, we are
least capable of acting sensibly in economic and social matters when we
face, or believe we face, an envious beneficiary of our decision. This is
true especially when we mistakenly tell ourselves that his envy is a direct

¹ Bronislaw Malinowski once criticized the tendency to hide concrete phenomena, for
which we have perfectly good terms, under pretentious neologisms: 'I must admit that
from the point of view of field-work I have never been quite clear how we are going to
test, measure or assess these somewhat formidable yet vague entities: euphoria and
dysphoria. . . . When we try to translate the state of being satisfied . . . into concrete
cases, we are faced not with the communal state of consciousness but rather with such
individual factors as personal resentment, thwarted ambition, jealousy, economic
grievance. . . . In any case, why not study the concrete and detailed manifestations of
grievance and of satisfactions instead of hiding them behind euphoria and dysphoria
writ large.' (In his introduction to: H. Ian Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia,
London, 1934, pp. xxiv ff.; Hansden [Conn.], 1961.)
consequence of our being better off, and will necessarily wane when we 
pander even to unrealistic demands. The allocation of scarce resources, 
in any society, is rarely optimal when our decision rests on fear of other 
men’s envy.

The loneliness of the envious man

The extent to which envy is a social form of behaviour, i.e., necessarily 
directed at someone else, is also apparent from the fact that without the 
other person the envier could never envy. Yet as a rule he specifically 
rejects any social relationship with the envied person. Love, friend­ 
liness, admiration—these approaches to another person are made in the 
expectation of reciprocity, recognition, and seek some kind of link. The 
envier wants none of this: he does not—exceptional cases apart—wish 
to be recognized as envious by the object of his envy, with whom, given 
the choice, he would prefer not to associate. The pure act of envy can be 
described thus: the more closely and intensively the envier concerns 
himself with the other person, the more he is thrown back on himself 
in self-pity. No one can envy without knowing the object of envy, or at 
least imagining him; but unlike other kinds of human emotional relation­ 
ships the envier can expect no reciprocal feelings. He wants no envy 
in return.

As people have always realized, however, the envier has little interest 
in the transfer of anything of value from the other’s possession to his 
own. He would like to see the other person robbed, dispossessed, 
stripped, humiliated or hurt, but he practically never conjures up a 
detailed mental picture of how a transfer of the other’s possessions to 
himself might occur. The pure type of envier is no thief or swindler in­ 
his own cause. In any case, where that which is envied is another man’s 
personal qualities, skill or prestige, there can be no question of theft; he 
may quite well, however, harbour a wish for the other man to lose his 
voice, his virtuosity, his good looks or his integrity.

The motives for envy, the stimuli of envious feelings, are ubiquitous, 
and the intensity of envy depends less on the magnitude of the stimulus 
than on the social disparity between the envier and the envied. The kind 
of maturity achieved by an individual which enables him to conquer his 
own envy does not seem to be a universally attainable attribute. The 
reasons for the varying role or effectiveness of envy in different societies 
must be sought, therefore, in the ethos of the respective cultures. Both 
the envier, who must somehow come to terms with observed inequalities 
in his life, and the envied person in trying to ignore the other’s envy (and 
both these emotional processes can sometimes occur simultaneously in 
one and the same person) will make use of creeds, ideologies, proverbs, 
etc., which will tend to reduce the power of envy and thus allow daily life 
to proceed with a minimum of friction and conflict.

Good luck and bad luck

It is not true, as many social critics would have us believe, that only the 
more fortunate people in this world, those with inherited possessions or 
chance wealth, have a vested interest in an ideology that inhibits envy. 
Such an ideology is in fact much more important to the envy-prone 
person, who can begin to make something of his life only when he has 
hammered out some sort of personal theory which diverts his attention 
from the enviable good fortune of others, and guides his energies 
towards realistic objectives within his scope.

One of the beliefs capable of repressing envy is the concept of the ‘blind goddess’ Fortune. A person is either lucky or unlucky, and 
whatever number he draws in life’s lottery is unconnected with the good 
or bad fortune of his neighbour. The world has, as it were, an inex­ 
haustible supply of good and bad luck. The most envy-ridden tribal 
cultures—such as the Dobuan and the Navaho—do not in fact possess 
the concept of luck at all, nor indeed the concept of chance. In such 
cultures no one is ever struck by lightning, for instance, without 
a malignant neighbour having willed it out of envy.

It is not easy to conclude from the general nature of a culture its degree 
of development or its economic institutions, e.g., which of its elements 
are generally regarded as immune from envy and which most vulnerable. 
Almost everywhere it is felt that universal values, such as personal 
health, youthfulness, children, have to be protected from the evil eye, the 
active expression of envy, and this is evident in the proverbs and the 
behaviour patterns that are employed by so many peoples to ward it off. It 
can, perhaps, be safely assumed that between individuals within a 
culture there is relatively little potential for envy in respect of those
values and inequalities which serve to integrate their society, e.g., the formal pomp and luxury exhibited by a head of a state, such as that still displayed by some of the remaining monarchies in Europe.\(^2\)

The capacity for envy is a psycho-social datum, not infrequently accompanied by marked somatic epiphenomena. Envy, as an emotion, can be treated as a problem of individual psychology; but there is far more to it than that, for it is also a sociological problem of the first order. How is it that so basic, universal and intensely emotional a constituent of the human psyche as envy—and the fear of envy, or at least the constant awareness of it—can lead to such different social consequences in various cultures? There are cultures which are obsessed by envy; virtually everything that happens is attributed to it. Yet there are others which seem to have largely succeeded in taming or repressing it. What causes such differences? Is it perhaps the varying frequency of certain types of personality and character? A considerable amount of research points in this direction. It may well be that certain cultural patterns encourage the envious or the less envious to set the tone; but this still does not explain what originally produced that tendency in a particular culture.

Although 'envy' exists in our language as an abstract noun and is used as such in literature, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as envy. There are people who envy, even some people habitually prone to envy, and we can observe emotional stirrings in ourselves and others which would be defined as feelings of envy; yet it is impossible to experience envy as an emotion or as a mood in the same way that we can feel anxiety or sadness. Envy is more comparable with 'being afraid'; we envy something or someone in the same way that we are afraid of something or someone. Envy is a directed emotion: without a target, without a victim, it cannot occur.

A susceptibility to envy exists to a much greater degree in man than in any other creature. A prime cause of this is the duration of childhood, which exposes the human individual far longer than any animal to the

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\(^2\) A group which in 1966 might have been specifically classified as resentful of the monarchy and the display of royal pomp were the Amsterdam Provos. A dispute as to whether the crown may still fulfill an envy-free function in a society developed between Edward Shils and N. Birnbaum (see E. Shils and M. Young, 'The Meaning of the Coronation,' in *The Sociological Review*, Vol. I, December 1953, pp. 63–81; and N. Birnbaum, ‘Monarchs and Sociologists,’ idem., Vol. XI, July 1955, pp. 5–23).

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experience of sibling jealousy within the family. On rare occasions, as in certain poems, envy is invoked as a stimulant, as something sublime or constructive. In such cases the poet has made a poor choice of words; he is really referring to emulation. The truly envious person almost never considers entering into fair competition.

Envy as such no more exists in a concrete sense than do grief, desire, joy, anxiety and fear. It consists, rather, of a set of psychological and physiological processes occurring in the individual which indicate certain qualities and which, if interpreted as the constituents of a whole, correspond to the meaning of one of these abstract words. In the most diverse languages the term 'envy' is sharply differentiated from other similar phenomena, yet it is remarkable how seldom 'envy' has been personified in art. Grief, joy and fear obviously lend themselves much more easily to representation. Nor can envy or an envious person be shown without some other point of reference. We can depict a person who is woebegone or joyful, but it is practically impossible to represent a man by himself in such a way that anybody who looks at the picture will instantly grasp that this man is envious. To do so requires a social situation, or symbols whose connection with envy is common knowledge to everyone within the particular culture.\(^3\)

The case is different in regard to the institutionalization of envy in a social structure. Envy can become more easily institutionalized than, say, desire or joy. We hold days of national mourning or rejoicing, but it is hardly possible to give to any emotion other than envy the status of an institution. As examples of envy manifested in social forms one might perhaps cite instances such as steeply progressive income tax, confis­catory death duties and corresponding customs among primitive peoples, such as the 'muru raid' of the Maoris.

Envy represents an almost entirely psychological and social phenomenon. Conceptually it can be differentiated much more sharply from other or similar psychological processes than can the processes deriving from it, which the behavioural sciences today employ as conceptual

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\(^3\) In earlier centuries envy (or the envious man) was sometimes depicted as a man riding on a dog with a bone in its mouth, e.g., the illustration 'Envy' on p. 14 of Heinz-Günter Deiters' *Die Kunst der Intrige* (The Art of Intrigue), Hamburg, 1966. The picture is taken from a series of woodcuts entitled 'The Seven Deadly Sins' by an anonymous master from the Constance region, ca. 1480–90, in the Albertina, Vienna.
substitutes for envy. Aggression, ambivalence, hostility, conflict, frustration, relative deprivation, tension, friction—all these terms are justified, but should not be employed to mask or conceal the basic phenomenon of envy. Until the end of the nineteenth century, indeed in occasional instances up to about a generation ago, most authors who had cause to deal with this side of human nature were quite familiar with envy as a clearly defined phenomenon. Not all cultures possess such concepts as hope, love, justice and progress, but virtually all people, including the most primitive, have found it necessary to define the state of mind of a person who cannot bear someone else’s being something, having a skill, possessing something or enjoying a reputation which he himself lacks, and who will therefore rejoice should the other lose his asset, although that loss will not mean his own gain. All cultures, too, have erected conceptual and ritual mechanisms designed as protection against those of their fellow men who are prone to this condition.

Most of the concepts and conceptual sequences by which we modern members of large, complex societies regulate our public affairs are inexplicable to a member of a primitive tribe, but our anxiety not to arouse envy and the situations which give rise to envy are immediately comprehensible to him and he can sympathize with our concern. This is quite clear from an abundance of ethnographical data.

Repression of the concept of envy?

It is most curious to note that at about the beginning of this century authors began to show an increasing tendency, above all in the social sciences and moral philosophy, to repress the concept of envy. This I regard as a genuine instance of repression. The political theorist and the social critic found envy an increasingly embarrassing concept to use as an explanatory category or in reference to a social fact. In isolated cases, and then only as a rider to other remarks, some modern authors have referred to envy as to something obvious, but even then they have almost invariably played down its significance. It may be invoked to explain a localized problem—why, for instance, some over-specialized critics refuse to find anything good to say about a book intended for a general readership; but the concept of envy is avoided if its recognition as an element of social reality would lead to the fundamentals of social policy being questioned.4

The indexes of relevant periodicals in the English language during recent years have been remarkably unproductive for the study of the concept of envy. There is not a single instance of ‘envy,’ ‘jealousy’ or ‘resentment’ in the subject indexes of the following periodicals: American Sociological Review, Vols. 1–25 (1936–1960); American Journal of Sociology, 1895–1947; Rural Sociology, Vols. 1–20 (1936–1955); The British Journal of Sociology, 1949–1959; American Anthropologist and the Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association, 1949–1958; Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vols. 1–20 (1945–1964). It is true that individual articles may be found here and there in these periodicals over the course of the years in which short and very penetrating observations are made concerning envy, clearly attributing significance to the term. But to the people who made the indexes, terms such as ‘envy,’ ‘resentment’ and ‘jealousy’ were so remote that they disregarded them. Under terms as vague as ‘aggression’ a few contributions may be found in which ‘envy’ sometimes makes an appearance. In the anthropological journals it was not difficult to find phenomena which, conceptually speaking, should properly be termed envy by looking under ‘witchcraft’ or ‘sorcery’ in the index. But oddly enough, the term ‘evil eye,’ which is the concomitant of envy, is, without exception, again omitted from the aforementioned indexes.

Now and again we find envy and its problems mentioned under veiled or misleading titles, or as part of a treatise on something else. Yet it is quite remarkable how often scientists have evaded this emotional syndrome. Why is it that for well over a generation writers have avoided tackling this subject, affecting as it does every human being? In such

4 Oliver Bruchfeld, for instance, wonders why ‘Envy, curiously enough, has been rather neglected by the psychologists; one hardly comes across it except in some disguise, e.g. that of jealousy, etc.’ (Inferiority Feelings in the Individual and the Group, New York, 1931, p. 109). Is it mere coincidence that so articulate an author as the young German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, managed to write his Theory of Social Conflict without once using the word ‘envy’? I do not think so, because elsewhere he has had no hesitation in ascribing, twice on one page, feelings of mutual envy to American and European intellectuals. (Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, [Society and Democracy in Germany], 1965, p. 320.)
cases depth psychology has long since taught us to suspect that repression is at work. The subject has been felt by many writers well equipped to handle it to be distasteful, unpleasant, painful and politically explosive. Many remarks that will be cited in this book support this interpretation.

Much as I should like to agree with all those authors who for millennia have consistently described and condemned the negative and destructive aspect of envy once it has become an end in itself, data will be presented to show that man cannot exist in society without envy. The utopia of a society free from envy, and in which there will no longer be any grounds for envy, is unlikely to be replaced by the totally utopian plan of eradicating envy from human nature by means of education; although so far in the history of social experiment people have been rather more successful when attempting to create the second sort of society than when striving towards one composed of unenvious equals.

Every man must be prone to a small degree of envy; without it the interplay of social forces within society is unthinkable. Only pathological envy in the individual, which tinges every other emotion, and the society entirely designed to appease imagined multitudes of enviers, are socially inoperative. The capacity for envy establishes a necessary social warning system. Here it is remarkable how seldom the vernacular forms of different languages permit one to say directly to another person: ‘Don’t do that. It will make me envious!’ Instead, we tend to talk in abstract terms of justice, saying that something or other is intolerable or unfair, or we relapse into sour and bitter silence. No child warns his parents against taking an ill-considered step by saying something like ‘If you do/give/allow that, I shall be envious of Jack/Jill.’ The taboo against an open declaration of envy is effective even at this level, although it is true that in both English and German one may say: ‘I envy you your success/your property’—i.e., one may only speak of one’s own envy when the actual situation between the participants, at least the ‘official’ version of it, excludes the possibility of genuine, destructive, malicious envy.

Oddly enough, in German one cannot even say: ‘I resent you.’ There is no such verb, and the alternative construction (literally, ‘I have a resentment against you’) sounds so clumsy and pompous that no one is likely to use it. In English one frequently hears and reads the expression: ‘I resent

5 David Riesman has pointed out that in a materially egalitarian and consumption-oriented society such as the American, people are still prone to imagine that another

Acting as though there were no envy

To anticipate one of the main theses of this work: the more both private individuals and the custodians of political power in a given society are able to act as though there were no such thing as envy, the greater will be the rate of economic growth and the number of innovations in general. The social climate best suited to the fullest, most unhampered deployment of man’s creative faculties (economic, scientific, artistic, etc.) is one where accepted normative behaviour, custom, religion, common sense and public opinion are more or less agreed upon an attitude which functions as if the envious person could be ignored. This represents a conviction shared by most members of such a society, enabling them to cope realistically, and relatively unconsumed by envy, with the evident differences that exist between people; the attitude, in effect, which enables legislators and governments to offer equal protection to the unequal achievements of the members of the community, while on occasion even offering them unequal advantages so that the community may benefit in the long run from achievements which initially, perhaps, only few are capable of attaining.

In reality these optimal conditions for growth and innovation are never more than partially reached. On the other hand many well-meant proposals for the ‘good society’ or the completely ‘just society’ are doomed because they are based on the false premise that this must be a society in which there is nothing left for anyone to envy. This situation can never occur because, as is demonstrable, man inevitably discovers something new to envy. In the utopian society in which we all would have not only the same clothes but the same facial expressions, one person would still envy the other for those imagined, innermost feelings which would enable him, beneath the egalitarian mask, to harbour his own private thoughts and emotions.”
person enjoys greater sexual gratification and to envy him for it: 'If someone else has a
new Cadillac, the other-directed person knows what that is, and that he can duplicate
the experience, more or less. But if someone else has a new lover, he cannot know what
that means. Cadillacs have been democratized. So has the sexual glamour, to a degree.
But there is a difference between Cadillacs and sexual partners in the degree of
mystery. And with the loss or submergence of moral shame and inhibitions ... the
other-directed person has no defenses against his own envy ... he does not want to miss
... the qualities of experience he tells himself the others are having.' (The Lonely
Crowd, New Haven, 1950, p. 155.) Man's fear of being envied for having a unique
sexual experience may have led, at least in part, to the various rituals, designed to ward
off envious spirits, performed prior to the consummation of marriage in many tribal
societies.

Both in literature and in discussions with a number of people as to
what they understand by envy I have been struck by the tendency to
use the word 'jealousy' instead of 'envy,' the former no doubt being
more tolerable to those who confess to it than the latter, which is an
ignominious sentiment. The jealous man has been defeated in a struggle
for power or in competition; he is not inferior in relation to the asset
under contention as, by definition, the envious man is. Yet even the
behavioural sciences often shirk the phenomenon of envy and of envious
behaviour as though it were taboo, disguising the motive of envy with
concepts such as ambivalence, aggression, tension, rivalry, jealousy and
similar indirect descriptions.

The primary role of envy in human society and the comparatively
unproblematical nature of common jealousy—or what is usually meant
by the term—are apparent both from language and from proverbs.

Envy and jealousy in English

The Oxford English Dictionary\(^1\) treats 'envy' and 'envious' as 'jealousy'
and 'jealous.' About four columns are devoted to both terms.

'Envy' and 'envious' in modern English are derived from the Latin
invidia and invidiosus, which have the same meanings. The verb 'to
envy' corresponds to the Latin invidere. In Spanish, Portuguese and
Italian there are similar derivatives from the Latin to denote the same
states of mind.